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Our world is full of choices and judgment and decision making is a ubiquitous part of daily life. 
In our favorite restaurant, we can choose from a long list of dishes and from at least twenty tea 
flavors. In supermarkets, we can choose from an almost endless amount of breakfast items. We 
can choose whether or not to go to our friend’s party tonight. Television offers more programs 
than we could ever watch. We think about where to spend our next holiday, and about whether 
we want red or white curtains in the living room. We also make more essential decisions: Whom 
to date, which house to buy, which job to apply for. Many of us also make important judgments 
and decisions, sometimes affecting the lives of others, as professionals: Judges decide about the 
future of suspects, doctors and psychologists make diagnostic decisions about patients and 
clients, business professionals make investment decisions, management decisions affect 
employees, and politicians make decisions affecting society.  
Sometimes, we think carefully before making a decision. We thoroughly analyze all the 
pros and cons before making a decision. Thinking about how to spend the next holiday, at home 
or in Indonesia, I could deliberate on the pros and cons of the options under consideration. I like 
sunny weather and exotic food. I also like exploring new places and meeting new people. On the 
other hand, I do not want to be on an airplane for hours on end and I would love to go to a 
festival in my home town this summer. And my living room still needs some painting. Based on a 
careful analysis of these considerations, I may decide to spend my next holiday in my home town 
or in Indonesia. However, we do not always carefully deliberate. Sometimes, we just go along 
with a feeling that one choice option (three weeks in Indonesia) is better than another (staying at 
home). When do we go along with our feelings, and when do we think carefully before making a 
decision?  
Whether we use intuition or deliberation in judgment and decision making depends on 
multiple factors, such as the availability of cognitive resources, time constraints and beliefs about 
the validity of the use of intuition or deliberation. In this dissertation, we focus on an ever-present 
factor in human judgment and decision making: the mood state of the decision maker. In our 
daily life, our mood states naturally fluctuate as a function of our good and bad experiences and 
they can have a pervasive influence on the way we think and act. When life is smiling towards us 
and good things happen to us, we usually feel happy. For example, I feel good when a friend 
spontaneously invites me for dinner, when the sun is shining, or when a paper gets accepted for 
publication. Sometimes, we experience difficulties or inconveniences that put us into a bad mood. 
Cycling to work on a rainy day, missing a train, or receiving bad news can ruin a person’s mood 
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state. When we experience problems or things go wrong, we usually feel bad. How does a 
person’s mood state affect the way this person makes a decision or evaluates a decision outcome?  
The goal of the current dissertation is to contribute to our understanding of how an 
individual’s mood state can affect judgment and decision making. In previous research, the 
influence of mood on intuitive versus deliberative judgment and decision making has been 
largely unexplored. Whether we use an intuitive or a deliberative decision strategy can have a 
considerable impact on our judgments and decisions. Our feelings and thoughts do not always 
point in the same direction. For example, my feelings might seduce me to have a chocolate bar as 
a snack, whereas upon more careful deliberation, I might decide to eat an apple. Our core idea is 
that in a happy mood state, decision makers tend to rely on their gut feelings, or intuition, and in 
a sad mood state, decision makers are more likely to rely on careful deliberation. The current 
dissertation provides innovative empirical tests of mood impacts on the use of affective intuition 
versus analytical deliberation in judgment and decision making and aims to further our 
understanding of reliance on intuition and deliberation as a function of incidental happy versus 
sad mood states of decision makers.  
The current ideas about the role of mood in judgment and decision making stem from a 
tuning approach (e.g., Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994; Schwarz, 2002). Our mood states might 
prepare us to act either intuitively or deliberatively. Mood is likely to serve as a conditioned 
stimulus for the nature of an environment, sometimes correctly signaling its benign or 
problematic nature and sometimes spilling over from one situation into another. The notion about 
the tuning function of mood is that an individual’s mood state automatically tunes cognition and 
emotion to meet the processing requirements of the type of situation it signals. In a benign 
environment, when things go smoothly and there is nothing to worry about, typically there is no 
need for careful deliberation. In such a situation, individuals can go along with their first affective 
responses, trust their intuition. However, in an environment that appears to be problematic or 
threatening and where the exact nature of problems remains unclear, it is important to be more 
careful and to thoroughly analyze all potentially relevant aspects of the situation.  
This dissertation serves two main objectives. First, we aim to show that mood state 
influences reliance on gut feelings versus analytical reasoning in decision making. In particular, 
we aim to show that a happy mood state imposes a tendency on decision makers to rely on 
feelings, or intuition, whereas in a sad mood state decision makers are more likely to rely on 
logical rules and on a careful analysis of decision options (Chapters 2, 3 and 4). Second, we aim 
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to gain more insight in the underlying mechanism by which mood state impacts reliance on 
intuition and deliberation in decision making. We aim to test our ideas about the tuning function 
of mood, focusing on the fit between mood states and intuitive versus deliberative decision 
strategies and on the impact of mood on the human tendency to prefer prototypical stimuli over 
less prototypical ones – an effect presumably reflecting affective reactions to familiarity 
(Chapters 4 and 5).  
In the current chapter I present an overview of the theory and empirical evidence relevant 
to the discussion of the role of mood in intuitive and deliberative judgment and decision making, 
starting with a brief overview of psychological perspectives on affect. I discuss various forms of 
affect and provide a working definition of those forms of affect that are relevant within the 
framework of the current dissertation: affective states, or mood states, and affective reactions, 
such as gut feelings. Next, I turn to a prominent distinction in the field of judgment and decision 
making: intuition versus deliberation. I continue with a discussion of the various roles of affect in 
judgment and decision making. I will contrast modern views of judgment and decision making, 
focusing on affective and intuitive aspects, to classical, normative models of judgment and 
decision making as purely rational and thoughtful. I will then turn to the tuning function of mood 
in intuitive versus deliberative judgment and decision making. There, I will outline my overall 
hypothesis concerning the influence of mood states on the reliance on careful deliberation and 
affective intuition, or sense and sensibility, in judgment and decision making. Finally, I will 
outline the primary hypotheses of each of the subsequent empirical chapters.  
 
Psychological perspectives on affect 
 
The strange thing about life is that though the nature of it  
must have been apparent to everyone for hundreds of years,  
no one has left any adequate account of it.  
The streets of London have their maps;  
but our passions are uncharted.   
(Virginia Woolf, Jacob’s Room, p. 90) 
 
Psychologists have long been interested in the nature of affect and in the way it appears to 
influence human behavior. In a sense, it initially seems surprising that there are no 
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straightforward answers to questions about the nature and functions of affect. In the foundations 
laid to understand affect and in current theorizing about affect from a psychological perspective, 
different approaches are distinguishable (e.g., Arnold, 1960; Clore & Ortony, 2000; Darwin, 
1872; Ekman, 1989; Freud, 1909; 1925; Frijda, 1986; 2007; Gazzaniga, 1972; Gazzaniga & 
LeDoux, 1978; Harré, 1986; James, 1884; 1890; Lazarus, 1984; LeDoux, 1996; Russell, 2003; 
Schachter & Singer, 1962; Wundt, 1907; Zajonc, 1980; 1984; see for an overview, e.g., Lewis & 
Haviland-Jones, 2000; Niedenthal, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2006; Oatley & Jenkins, 1996). While 
these approaches differ in important ways, they appear to complement rather than contradict each 
other, focusing on different aspects and functions of affect and often using similar labels for 
various forms of affect. This vagueness about definitions of affect requires researchers to clarify 
their usage of the terms.  
In the current dissertation, the term affect is used as a general term to denote affective 
states, which I will refer to as moods, as well as affective reactions, such as gut feelings. Our 
characterizations of these various forms of affect are fairly conventional (e.g., Damasio, 1994; 
Frijda, 1986; 2007; Russel, 2003; Schwarz & Clore, 2007). We use a definition of moods as 
diffuse affective states, or background feelings, which last relatively long. You can be in a bad 
mood state that lasts for minutes, or hours. People do not necessarily know the reason for the 
mood state they are in. In contrast, affective reactions, or feelings are about an object, person, 
situation, or choice option. This latter category of affect is typically more intense and shorter of 
duration than mood and includes gut feelings, somatic markers (Damasio, 1994) and bodily 
signals about choice options or targets of judgments. 
In an attempt to understand the role of affect in judgment and decision making, it is 
important to realize that various forms of affect, such as mood states and affective reactions, can 
influence judgment and decision making in different ways and might even interact in their impact 
on judgment and decision making. An intriguing idea, inspired by research on cognitive tuning, is 
that affective states, or mood states, impact the reliance on affective reactions in judgment and 
decision making. We aim to provide the first empirical test for the idea that compared to a sad 
mood state, in a happy mood state people are more likely to use their affective reactions towards 
various decision options as a basis for decision making. We focus on mild fluctuations in mood 
states, as we all experience in our daily lives. Clinical disorders in affect fall beyond the scope of 
this dissertation. More specifically, we focus on the influence of happy and sad mood states on 
the reliance on affective reactions versus analytical reasoning in judgment and decision making.  
  General Introduction 
13 
Intuition versus deliberation in judgment and decision making 
 
Below the surface stream, shallow and light, 
Of what we say we feel – below the stream, 
As light, of what we think we feel – there flows 
With noiseless current strong, obscure and deep, 
The central stream of what we feel indeed. 
(Matthew Arnold, St Paul and Protestantism, 1870/2007) 
 
When people make a decision, one thing they can do is rely on their “gut feelings” or intuition. 
Recently, many scholars from fields ranging from social, cognitive and neuropsychology to 
business and management have stressed their belief in the importance of intuition in judgment 
and decision making (e.g., Böhm & Brun, 2008; Damasio, 1994; De Vries, Holland, Witteman, 
Vente, & Dijksterhuis, 2008; Dijksterhuis, 2007; Gigerenzer, 2007; Hogarth, 2001; LeDoux, 
1996; Lieberman, 2000; Klein, 2003; Myers, 2002; Plessner, Betsch, & Betsch, 2008; Sadler-
Smith, 2008; Wilson, 2002). As one of them voices it, “It’s impossible for us to function 
effectively without using ‘gut feeling’. Intuition presents itself uninvited to us rapidly, and in 
many different guises, and under the right circumstances its effects can be life-changing and life-
saving” (Sadler-Smith, 2008, p.1).  
The powers and perils of intuition 
Obviously, intuition has its powers and its perils (Myers, 2002). On the one hand, it tends 
to overlook details, may miss important facts, and tends to ignore instruction. On the other hand, 
intuition often enables us to escape the bounds of conventional thinking, to see problems in new 
and novel ways, and to come up with “out of the box” solutions (e.g., Sadler-Smith, 2008). 
Intuition is usually fast and apparently effortless (e.g., Plessner & Czenna, 2008). Moreover, it 
can deal with vast amounts of information (e.g., Betsch, Plessner, Schwieren, & Gütig, 2001; 
Dijksterhuis, 2004; 2007). Intuition is typically experienced as a conscious gut feeling. Its 
origins, however, mostly stay outside of consciousness (e.g., Sadler-Smith, 2008). Whereas 
Freud’s view of the unconscious was that of a primitive part of mind, full of hidden and 
suppressed desires and forces (e.g., Freud, 1925), the modern psychological view of the 
unconscious is different. In contemporary psychology, researchers have provided evidence for the 
unconscious as a rather smart and highly efficient information processor (e.g., Bargh, 1997; 
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Dijksterhuis, 2007; Hassin, Uleman, & Bargh, 2005; Wilson, 2002). If used under the right 
circumstances and well-informed by prior experience, learning and feedback, intuition might be a 
powerful tool for everyday as well as professional decision makers (e.g., Dijksterhuis & 
Nordgren, 2006; Sadler-Smith, 2008).  
Intuition comes in many forms, such as creative, affective, social, moral, and experiential 
intuition (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2007; Epstein, 1994; Gigerenzer, 2007; Gladwell, 2005; Haidt, 2001; 
Sadler-Smith, 2008). Scientific definitions of intuition vary, with different disciplines 
highlighting different aspects. In our studies, we focused on affective intuition, on “gut feelings”. 
Our notion of intuition in judgment and decision making is of a feeling that something is right or 
wrong, or that one option is better than another, without being able to explain why. Individuals 
differ in the extent to which they experience and rely on intuition (e.g., Betsch, 2008; Epstein, 
Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996). However, contrary to popular belief about female intuition, 
empirical research generally fails to observe any significant differences between men and women 
in intuition (e.g., Epstein et al., 1996; Gigerenzer, 2007). 
In two minds 
A common conception in dual-processing, or dual-system, models in contemporary 
psychology (e.g., Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Kahneman, 2003; Kuhl, 2000; Sloman, 1996; Strack 
& Deutsch, 2004; see also Hamm, 1988) is that people process information in two different, 
complementary ways. The first way of processing, also referred to as System 1 processing (e.g., 
Sloman, 1996), is generally characterized as relatively fast and unconscious, parallel, automatic, 
associative and affect-laden. The second way of processing, also referred to as deliberative, 
rational processing, or System 2 processing, is generally characterized as slow, analytical, 
conscious, serial, rule-based, and relatively affect-free. Deliberation notices details, likes 
established methods, facts and data, and tends to follow instruction. 
Dual-processing models have also been adopted in the field of judgment and decision 
making (e.g., Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2003). Decision makers can use deliberation, or System 2, 
and rely on a careful, explicit analysis of the information relevant to the decision task at hand. 
They can also rely on System 1, which is used to denote nondeliberative forms of judgment and 
decision making as diverse as reliance on intuition, or gut feelings, heuristics, scripts, and general 
knowledge structures. System 1 judgments and decisions are associated with biases and errors, 
but they often “satisfice” our needs; they help us to make judgments and decisions that are good 
enough, without requiring too much of our time and energy (e.g., Kahneman, 2003; Simon, 1955; 
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1957; 1983; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Moreover, under the right circumstances intuitions 
outperform deliberation (e.g., Damasio, 1994; Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006; Gigerenzer, 2007; 
2008; Plessner & Czenna, 2008; Wilson, 2002).  
In the current dissertation, we do not aim to find out whether intuition or deliberation is 
best for making judgments and decisions. In fact, we believe that there is no right way of 
judgment and decision making in general. We are interested in what makes people trust their gut 
feelings, their affective reactions towards choice options and targets of judgment, as opposed to 
careful deliberation.  
 
Affect in judgment and decision making 
 
Our focus on the influence of happy versus sad mood states on reliance on emotional reactions 
versus analytical reasoning in judgment and decision making fits into the growing interest in the 
role of affect in judgment and decision making (e.g., Bechara, 2004; Cohen & Blum, 2002; 
Damasio, 1994; Kahneman, 2003; LeDoux, 1996; Peters & Slovic, 2000; Peters, Västfjäll, 
Gärling, & Slovic, 2006; Schwarz, 2000; Wilson, 2002; Zeelenberg, Nelissen, Breugelmans, & 
Pieters, 2008). Some researchers focus on affective influences on judgment and decision making, 
others on affective consequences. Moreover, different approaches study different forms of affect, 
including anticipatory affect that results from the decision or judgment task and incidental affect 
that is unrelated to the task at hand (see for an overview e.g., Finucane, Peters, & Slovic, 2003; 
Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; Schwarz & Clore, 2007; Winkielman, Knutson, Paulus, & Trujillo, 
2007). The belief in the importance of affect in judgment and decision making shared by those 
recent approaches contrasts sharply with classical decision theories. 
Contrasting modern views to classical, normative models 
Classical decision theories often state that affect only plays a small role in decision 
making, or if it does, it dilutes the otherwise rational, analytical decision making process (e.g., 
Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). According to these normative models of decision making 
initially proposed by economists, in an ideal world, the assumption is that decision makers have 
complete information about the values and probabilities attached to different decision options, 
entirely understand this information, and use it to calculate and compare the advantages and 
disadvantages of each decision option (e.g., de Finetti, 1937; Savage, 1954; Von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1947; for an overview, see for example Baron, 2004; Hastie & Dawes, 2001). 
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However, actual human decision making often deviates from these assumptions (e.g., Kahneman, 
2003; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; 1974).  
In real life, we simply do not have enough time and cognitive resources for such careful 
deliberation about every single decision we need to make. According to Nobel laureate Herbert 
Simon (1957; 1983), we should think of human reason or rationality in terms of its efficiency in 
achieving goals rather than in terms of its consistency with normative rules. Simon argued that 
we should think of human rationality as “bounded” and “satisficing”: Decisions are rational if 
they help us achieve a desired end state and do not take up too much of our time and energy to 
get there. If we would fully apply the rules of normative decision models, we might run the risk 
of “analysis paralysis”, to be frozen into indecisiveness because of an explosion of options or 
endless deliberation on all the pros and cons involved (e.g., Damasio, 1994; Sadler-Smith, 2008). 
The neurologist Antonio Damasio (1994) described the indecisiveness of one of his patients, who 
suffered from a lack of emotional reactions due to brain damage and was unable to come up with 
a suggestion for the date of the next appointment, due to consideration of an endless amount of 
potential dates and the pros and cons involved with each of them. Affect might help us to at least 
make a decision. Moreover, affect might sometimes even help to make good decisions. 
Affect and the quality of decisions  
Affect can impact the quality of decisions, for better or for worse (e.g., Bechara, Damasio, 
Tranel, & Damasio, 1997; Damasio, 1994; Shiv, Loewenstein, Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 
2005; Feldman Barrett & Salovey, 2002; Schwarz & Clore, 2007). It can have significant 
implications for an individual’s well-being. For example, in the domain of health preferences, 
affect can have a pervasive influence on a patient’s treatment decisions (e.g., Peters, Lipkus, & 
Diefenbach, 2006). Affect can impact the quality of decisions in various ways. 
On the one hand, affect can disrupt judgment and decision processes. Sometimes, 
emotional reactions appear to distract decision makers from a rational strategy (e.g., Shiv et al., 
2005). Moreover, affect can (over)load cognitive resources (e.g., Mackie & Worth, 1989; Seibert 
& Ellis, 1991), bias attention, perception and memory (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1988), and lure 
people into losing their self-control (e.g., Loewenstein, 1996). We sometimes make bad decisions 
or incorrect judgments because we are lost in anger, paralyzed by fear, blinded by love, or 
drowned in sorrow. In a distant past, reflex-like, uncontrollable emotional responses, such as 
“freezing” in front of a predator, might have helped our ancestors to survive, as suggested by 
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evolutionary models of affect (e.g., Darwin, 1872), but such hard-wired responses are not 
necessarily adaptive in our current environment.  
On the other hand, affective reactions can also improve judgments and decisions (e.g., 
Feldman Barrett & Salovey, 2002). People lacking emotional reactions can have serious 
difficulty making good decisions; knowing without feeling appears insufficient for making good 
decisions (e.g., Bechara et al., 1997; Damasio, 1994). Based on prior experiences with a stimulus, 
affect can serve as a helpful warning signal or provide useful summarized information about the 
stimulus. Moreover, affect can prioritize the processing of important information by drawing our 
attention to it or by helping us to stay focused on this information. Affect can also help to 
construct preferences or serve as a “common currency”, when different decision options are hard 
to compare (i.e., comparing apples to oranges) and it seems impossible to decide solely based on 
reason (e.g., Damasio, 1994; Peters, 2006).  
The interplay of affective states and reactions in judgment and decision making 
Previous research showed that the impact of affective states, or mood, on judgment and 
decision making can be pervasive (e.g., Bower, 1981; Bless, 2001; Forgas, 1995; Isen, 2000; 
Schwarz & Clore, 1988). For instance, mood has been found to color judgments. People use their 
current mood state as information and project their feelings on to a target of judgment, resulting 
in mood-congruent judgments (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983; 1988; 2007). In a happy mood state, 
we appear to watch the world around us through rose-colored glasses and judge things positively, 
whereas in a sad mood state, we judge the world around us more negatively. Moreover, as 
outlined above, affective reactions can also have a great impact on judgments and decisions. 
Surprisingly, the interplay between affective states and affective reactions in judgment and 
decision making has so far been unexplored. While mood influences on judgment and decision 
making have already attracted quite a bit of attention from scientists, potential mood impacts on 
one of the most prominent distinctions in the field of judgment and decision making (i.e., the 
reliance on affective reactions versus logical analysis) have so far been neglected.  
 
Tuning in: A matter of mood 
 
We explore the idea that mood operates as a tuning mechanism, preparing people to judge and 
decide either intuitively or deliberatively. William James (1890) noted that “thinking is for 
doing”. According to James, our cognitive processes serve our action. Our thoughts and feelings 
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might help us to behaviorally adapt to situational requirements. The proposed tuning function of 
mood in decision making in this dissertation stems from the notion of situated cognition (e.g., 
Clore et al., 1994; Schwarz, 2002). In that view, our cognitive processes are tuned to meet 
environmental needs; they are responsive to the environment in which we try to achieve our 
goals. These models hold that several factors fulfill a signaling function to inform us about the 
processing requirements we face. These factors include environmental safety and danger signals 
(or more generally: situational cues for the benign or problematic state of the environment we are 
in) as well as internal cues that have become associated with the problematic or benign nature of 
the environment, including an individual’s mood state.  
Mood states are typically assumed to reflect the general state of an individual, to be 
“barometers of the ego” (e.g., Jacobsen, 1957; Nowlis & Nowlis, 1956) and to function as a 
conditioned signal for the benign or problematic state of the situation we are in. Mood states 
often outlast the inducing event. Thus, our mood state can spill over from one situation into 
another. Whereas our mood states often provide us with correct information about the current 
state of the environment and can thereby automatically tune cognition and emotion so that they 
best serve the individual in its current context, tuning effects of mood are likely to occur 
regardless of the actual state of the environment (cf. Clore et al., 1994; Förster, Friedman, 
Özelsel, & Denzler, 2006; Schwarz, 1990; 2002).  
In short, we argue that a cheerful mood imposes a tendency on decision makers, 
“prepares” decision makers, to rely on intuition, and that a somber mood results in an inclination 
to rely on thorough deliberation, but that mood is unlikely to force decision makers into intuition 
or deliberation. Tuning effects of mood can be overridden by other factors, such as an 
individual’s goal, or task demands (Schwarz, 2002). 
Mood and information processing  
In line with the ideas above about the tuning of mood, a large body of empirical evidence 
indeed shows a differential impact of positive and negative mood state on information processing 
(e.g., Bless & Schwarz, 1999; Isen, 1999; Isen & Means, 1983; Hermsen, Holland, & van 
Knippenberg, 2008; Mitchell & Phillips, 2007; Schwarz & Clore, 2007). For instance, compared 
to a sad mood state, a happy mood state has been found to increase reliance on general 
knowledge structures, such as scripts (Bless et al., 1996) and stereotypes (Bodenhausen, Kramer, 
& Süsser, 1994). Moreover, in comparison to a sad or neutral mood state, a happy mood state 
appeared to increase associative processing (Bolte, Goschke & Kuhl, 2003; Hänze & Hesse, 
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1993; Isen, Johnson, Mertz, & Robinson, 1985; Storbeck & Clore, 2005) and reliance on the ease 
of retrieval heuristic (Ruder & Bless, 2003). In addition, a negative mood results in a stronger 
tendency to elaborate on information than a positive mood state (e.g., Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & 
Strack, 1990; Fiedler, 1988).  
Whereas tuning models provide a useful theoretical account for these findings, several 
alternative accounts are possible. Capacity models hold that positive affect reduces cognitive 
capacity, leaving individuals in a happy mood state with no choice but to rely on heuristic 
processing (e.g., Isen, Means, Patrick, & Nowicki, 1982; Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987; 
Mackie & Worth, 1989; 1991). Motivational models assume that, for a variety of reasons, a 
happy mood reduces processing motivation (e.g., Schwarz, 1990; Wegener & Petty, 1994). Some 
motivational models assume that individuals in a positive mood state are motivated to maintain 
their cheerful feelings, causing them to refrain from elaboration which is supposed to be a 
potential threat to their current mood state (e.g., Wegener & Petty, 1994; Wegener, Petty, & 
Smith, 1995). More detailed discussions of theoretical accounts for mood effect on information 
processing have been provided elsewhere (e.g., Martin & Clore, 2001). Jointly, these theories and 
models of mood impacts on information processing appear to substantiate the conclusion that a 
positive mood results in System 1 processing, whereas a negative mood induces an analytical, 
System 2 processing style. Embedded in this general framework, our core idea is that a happy 
mood state tunes in to reliance on affective reactions, whereas a sad mood state tunes in to 
reliance on logical analysis. 
 
The current dissertation:  
Mood and reliance on intuition versus deliberation in judgment and decision making 
 
The primary aim of the current dissertation is to investigate the impact of mood states on reliance 
on intuition and deliberation in judgment and decision making. Taken together, there is ample 
evidence for the differential effect of positive and negative mood states on information 
processing (see for a review e.g., Clore et al., 1994; Schwarz & Clore, 2007). However, little is 
known about reliance on intuition versus deliberation in judgment and decision making as a 
function of mood states. The current dissertation provides the first empirical test of reliance on 
affective reactions versus thorough deliberation as a function of the mood state of a decision 
maker. Our second main objective is to further our understanding of the underlying mechanism 
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by which mood influences reliance intuition versus deliberation in judgment and decision 
making. We suggest a tuning account. 
Overview of the empirical chapters 
This dissertation consists of four empirical chapters describing studies that were designed 
to further our understanding of how sad and happy mood states impact judgment and decision 
making. The studies described in these chapters follow the following general format: In the first 
stage of each study, we manipulated (most studies) or measured participants’ mood state. We 
used various methods to induce either a happy or a sad mood state. In the second part of our 
studies, we measured judgments and decisions of participants in these mood conditions, using a 
variety of established as well as newly designed paradigms.  
The first three empirical chapters of this dissertation are concerned with the question how 
mood states influence reliance on feeling versus thinking in decision making. Chapter 2 considers 
the role of mood in intuitive decisions making. In three studies, the hypothesis was tested that 
compared to an incidental sad mood state, a happy mood state causes decision makers to more 
strongly rely on their gut feelings or affective signals. We investigated the impact of mood on 
decisions which participants made in a task commonly used to test intuitive decision making in 
laboratory settings: the Iowa gambling task.  
Chapter 3 considers the complement of Chapter 2: It considers the influence of the mood 
state of decision makers on the extent to which they stick to simple, logical rules in decision 
making. Again, gambling paradigms were used. Study 3.1 tested the influence of induced sad 
versus happy mood states in investment decisions that require decision makers to follow a 
simple, logical rule to maximize expected profit. Study 3.2 employed a newly designed gambling 
paradigm, the Radboud University Logic versus Experience (RULE) task, to test the extent to 
which decision makers stick to a logical rule in a relatively simple gambling task. We 
hypothesized that decision makers in a sad mood would more strongly base their decisions on 
these simple and logical rules than decision makers in a happy mood state.  
In Chapter 4, we tested our hypothesis about mood impacts on reliance on feeling versus 
thinking in another way, which also allowed us to more directly test our ideas about the tuning 
function of mood. Previous research, which mostly considered the fit between decision strategies 
and regulatory focus (i.e., focus on gains versus losses; e.g., Avnet & Higgins, 2006; Förster & 
Higgins, 2005), showed that fitting (versus non-fitting) decisions increase the subjective value of 
decision outcomes. Therefore, we expected that decision makers would value chosen outcomes 
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higher when their decision strategy matches their current mood state. We reasoned as follows: If 
a happy mood state indeed induces a tendency in decision makers to rely on intuition, it probably 
fits with deciding based on feelings towards various decision options (i.e., an intuitive decision 
strategy). And conversely, if a sad mood state indeed induces a tendency in decision makers to 
rely on deliberation, it probably fits with deciding based on a careful analysis of decision options 
(i.e., a deliberative decision strategy).  
In the last empirical chapter (Chapter 5) of this dissertation, we aimed to further test the 
underlying mechanism by which mood might impact judgment and decision making. We 
investigated the influence of sad and happy mood states on the preference for prototypicality. 
This allowed us to more directly test our hypothesis about the tuning function of mood. People 
tend to prefer prototypical stimuli over less prototypical ones – an effect presumably reflecting 
affective reactions to familiarity (e.g., Bornstein, 1989; Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & 
Reber, 2003; Lee, 2001). This preference might depend on the extent to which individuals are 
tuned towards safety concerns (cf. e.g., Gigerenzer, 2008). We investigated whether mood 
changes the hedonic value of prototypicality. If a sad mood state indeed signals a problematic and 
potentially dangerous environment, tuning individuals towards safety concerns, familiarity is 
likely to be positive. Conversely, if a happy mood signals benign environments, this would make 
safety concerns less central and leave prototypes just average rather than positive. Therefore, we 
tested our hypothesis that compared to a sad mood, a happy mood would decrease the positive 
hedonic value of prototypes. 
Concluding remarks 
The remainder of this dissertation consists of four empirical chapters and a final 
discussion chapter. In this final chapter, I will integrate the empirical findings from previous 
chapters and consider key findings and implications of the empirical findings described in this 
dissertation. I will also suggest potential avenues for future research. The four empirical chapters 
that follow are all based on articles that have recently been published, or are under review or in 
preparation for potential publication in scientific journals. To ensure that these chapters can be 
read independently from each other, there is some overlap of content in the introductions and 
discussions.  
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The intellect has little to do on the road to discovery. 
There comes a leap in consciousness, call it intuition or what you will,  
and the solution comes to you and you don’t know how or why. 
(Albert Einstein in Moskowski, 1972) 
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Abstract 
 
This research aimed to test the role of mood in the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara, 
Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994). In the IGT, participants can win or lose money by 
picking cards from four different decks. They have to learn by experience that two decks are 
overall advantageous and two decks are overall disadvantageous. Previous studies have shown 
that at an early stage in this card-game, players begin to display a tendency towards the 
advantageous decks. Subsequent research suggested that at this stage, people base their decisions 
on conscious gut feelings (Wagar & Dixon, 2006). Based on empirical evidence for the relation 
between mood and cognitive processing-styles, we expected and consistently found that, 
compared to a negative mood state, reported and induced positive mood states increased this 
early tendency towards advantageous decks. Our results provide support for the idea that a 
positive mood causes stronger reliance on affective signals in decision-making than a negative 
mood. 
 
Keywords: mood, decision-making, gut feelings, Iowa gambling task, intuition 
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Introduction 
 
Many of us are familiar with the phenomenon that we feel that something is right or wrong, or that 
one choice option is better than another, without necessarily being able to explain where this “gut 
feeling” comes from or what it is based on. When people make a decision, one thing they can do is 
rely on such affective reactions towards decision-options. Decision-makers can also base their 
decision on a cognition-based, rule-governed and precise analysis of the different options. This 
distinction between decision-making based on feelings and decision-making based on thorough 
deliberation is a prominent distinction in psychology and decision-making research (e.g., Betsch, 
Hoffman, Hoffrage, & Plessner, 2003; Epstein, 1994; Evans, 2008; Hogarth, 2005; Kahneman, 
2003; Lieberman, 2000; Wilson, 2002). The central question we ask here is whether mood is a 
moderator of people’s reliance on feelings versus deliberation in decision-making. In line with 
others, we define mood states as diffuse affective states that are not linked to specific stimuli and 
that are relatively long-lasting (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Russell, 2003; see for differences between mood 
and emotions Zeelenberg et al., 2008). Based on empirical evidence for the relationship between 
mood and information processing (see Clore et al., 1994 for a review), we aim to explore whether 
people in a positive mood state are more likely to base their decisions on their gut feelings than 
people in a negative mood state. 
Affect in decision-making 
Cognitive psychologists have traditionally assumed that affective processes play only a 
small role in decision-making. However, some recent findings suggest that affect can in fact be 
important in decisions (e.g., Bechara et al., 1997; Cohen & Blum, 2002; Kahneman, 2003; Wagar 
& Dixon, 2006; Zajonc, 1980; and see the framework of emotional functions as proposed by 
Pfister and Böhm, 2008). For example, according to Damasio (1994), decision-processes may be 
based on affective signals. More specifically, people use somatic markers, that is emotion-based, 
physiological signals. These signals are formed in situations in which people repeatedly 
experience rewards or punishments. Reliance on such affective reactions towards different 
response options may play a particularly important role when decisions have to be made in an 
uncertain environment. In the present research we aim to investigate when such affective signals 
guide behaviour in a laboratory task that models decision-making under uncertainty: the Iowa 
Gambling Task (IGT).  
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In the IGT (Bechara et al., 1994; 1997) participants can win or lose money by picking 
cards from four different decks, two overall advantageous and two overall disadvantageous. Decks 
A and B, the bad decks, involve relatively high immediate rewards with the turning of each card, 
but even higher losses with the turning of some cards, resulting in an overall net loss for every 10 
cards turned. Decks C and D are the good decks, with the combinations of moderate rewards with 
the turning of each card and relatively small losses with the turning of some cards resulting in an 
overall net gain for every 10 cards turned. At an early stage in this card-game, after experiencing 
the first big losses in the bad decks, players start to display a tendency towards the advantageous 
decks. Research suggests that this tendency is guided by affective signals (Bechara, Tranel, 
Damasio, & Damasio, 1996; Bechara et al., 1997; Damasio, 1994; Wagar & Dixon, 2006).  
Our focus here is on the influence of mood on reliance on feelings in the IGT in this early 
stage of the game. Based on recent work (e.g., Dunn, Dalgleish, &Lawrence, 2006; Maia & 
McClelland, 2004; Wagar & Dixon, 2006), we define such feelings in the IGT as conscious gut 
feelings about which decks are good and which decks are bad. These arise early in the game, after 
the first high losses in the bad decks. Reliance on gut feelings can be contrasted to reliance on 
more certain, quantitative knowledge, arrived at through analytical thinking and detailed conscious 
processing. We believe that, compared to a negative mood, a positive mood causes people to rely 
more strongly on their gut feelings in the IGT. This would result in better performance early in the 
IGT in a positive mood than in a negative mood, due to a stronger feeling-based tendency towards 
the advantageous decks, when people are still highly uncertain (Maia & McClelland, 2004; Wagar 
& Dixon, 2006) about which strategy is right. We will now explain our ideas in more detail. 
Initially, researchers from the Iowa laboratory (e.g., Bechara et al., 1994; 1997; Damasio, 
1994) claimed that affective signals can operate not only consciously (as a “gut feeling” about the 
goodness or badness of a given response option), but also nonconsciously. However, evidence for 
the role of unconsciously operating affective signals in the Iowa gambling task has been reviewed 
critically (e.g., Dunn et al., 2006; Maia & McClelland, 2004). Dunn and colleagues (2006) argue 
that evidence for a lack of conscious knowledge that players in the IGT have about which decks 
are good and which decks are bad is weak. People’s awareness about which decks are good and 
which decks are bad probably arises earlier in the game than other researchers previously claimed 
(e.g., Bechara et al., 1994; 1997; Damasio, 1994). 
In the current chapter, we are concerned with the conditions related to people’s reliance on 
conscious gut feelings in decision-making in the IGT. Maia and McClelland (2004) identified 
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three levels of awareness in the IGT (cf. e.g., Dienes & Scott, 2005, who made similar 
categorizations of different levels of awareness; and see Price & Norman, 2008). At Level 0, 
participants have no conscious knowledge at all about which decks are good and which decks are 
bad and they do not have a preference for the good decks. At Level 1, participants do show a 
conscious preference, but do not appear to have explicit knowledge about the basis for this 
preference. They are not able to explain why they prefer certain decks and they appear to base 
their behaviour on conscious gut feelings. At Level 2, participants have gained knowledge about 
the relative values involved in the decks and they can use this knowledge to explain their 
preference for the good decks. In other words, they have become conscious of another thing. They 
have explicit, fully verbalizable knowledge of the task itself, not just of their preferences. They 
have now reached full awareness in the IGT. Maia and McClelland (2004) provided evidence 
against the claim that affective signals can guide behaviour unconsciously, when awareness is still 
at Level 0. Based on this evidence, Dunn and colleagues (2006) conclude that the claim that 
affective signals can operate nonconsciously remains questionable and requires stronger empirical 
support.  
We were interested in the question whether mood might moderate whether or not people 
would rely on gut feelings (or Level 1 awareness), early in the IGT. Wagar and Dixon (2006) 
provided evidence that consciously accessible affective reactions influence card selections early in 
the IGT, prior to Level 2 awareness. That is, participants began to choose advantageously before 
they were able to explain why. They formed affective signals, measurable in the form of galvanic 
skin responses (GSRs) to the different decks. They showed higher GSRs when they were about to 
select a card from a bad deck than when they went for a good deck. This difference in anticipatory 
GSRs was correlated with a subsequent behavioural preference for the good decks (Wagar & 
Dixon, 2006). Bringing together this evidence for affective guidance in the IGT prior to Level 2 
(or full) awareness with the evidence against affective guidance when awareness is still at Level 0 
(completely absent), we conclude that at an early stage of the IGT, people base their responses on 
conscious gut feelings towards the different decks of cards, that is Level 1 awareness.  
Mood and gut feelings 
The idea that people base their decisions on feelings at an early stage of the IGT is 
completely in line with previous research showing that judgments and decisions can be driven by 
gut feelings (e.g., Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Strick, Holland, & Van Knippenberg, in press; Wilson, 
2002; Wilson, et al., 1993; Zajonc, 1980). Reliance on gut feelings in decision-making may 
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fluctuate. People can rely on their first affective reactions towards various decision options, but 
they can also rely on a more careful, deliberative decision-strategy. If individuals adopt an 
analytical processing style, gut feelings are of less importance in guiding decision-making (e.g., 
Wilson et al., 1993). We suggest that the use of affect-based or deliberation-based decision-
strategies may be moderated by mood. Based on empirical evidence for the relation between mood 
and cognitive processing-styles, we expect that mood might influence reliance on affective signals 
in the IGT, thereby affecting the tendency towards the advantageous decks in the early stage of the 
task. 
Mood has consistently been found to influence the way that people process information 
(e.g., Bless & Schwarz, 1999; Bolte et al., 2003; Fiedler, 1988; Hänze & Hesse, 1993; Isen, 1999; 
Isen & Means, 1983; Ruder & Bless, 2003; Schwarz & Clore, 2007; see Clore et al., 1994 for a 
review; see Martin & Clore, 2001 for a discussion of theoretical accounts). A number of studies 
have shown that in a happy mood, people rely more strongly on general knowledge structures, 
such as stereotypes (Bodenhausen et al., 1994) and scripts (Bless et al., 1996) than in a sad mood. 
Moreover, in a sad mood, individuals are more likely to deliberate than in a happy mood. For 
instance, several studies showed a differential impact of argument strength under different mood 
states (see e.g., Bless & Schwarz, 1999 for a review).  
Here, we focus on a different way in which mood can influence judgment and decision-
making. Our core idea is that mood influences the reliance on feelings. Some of our recent results 
are in line with this idea. In a study manipulating mood and affect-based versus cognition-based, 
deliberative decision-strategies, we found that a positive mood matched well with affect-based 
decision-making, whereas a negative mood matched well with deliberative decision-making (De 
Vries, Holland, & Witteman, 2008b). Based on our idea that mood influences reliance on gut 
feelings, we expect that mood influences decision-making in the IGT. We suggest that people in a 
happy mood tend to rely on their feelings when they make decisions, which would enhance their 
performance in the IGT when awareness is at Level 1, while people in a sad mood are more 
cautious and rely on their feelings less. 
The present research 
The three studies reported in this paper aimed to test whether mood moderates the 
tendency towards the advantageous decks in the early stage of the IGT, when awareness appears 
to be at Level 1 (a preference for the good decks, without explicit knowledge about the basis for 
this preference) and affective signals apparently guide decisions in this card-game (Wagar & 
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Dixon, 2006). We suggest that, compared to a negative mood, a positive mood leads to stronger 
reliance on these affective processes. Therefore, we hypothesized that, in the early stage of the 
game, when awareness is at Level 1, people in a positive mood will choose more cards from the 
advantageous decks than people in a negative mood.  
In order to test mood influences in the different stages of the IGT, with awareness 
increasing from Level 0 (absent) through 1 (gut feelings) to 2 (full awareness, with correct 
explanations), we focused on five subsequent blocks of 20 card selections (e.g., Bechara, Tranel, 
& Damasio, 2000; Evans, Bowman, & Turnbull, 2005). In the first stage of the game (roughly 
cards 1 to 20, Block 1), players sample the four decks. Participants start playing the IGT with no 
knowledge or experiences regarding the game at all. With awareness still at Level 0 (absent), we 
did not expect an effect of mood on choice behaviour in Block 1.  
After participants have experienced the first losses in the disadvantageous decks, players 
begin to display a preference for choosing cards from the advantageous decks, but show no signs 
of knowledge about the basis for this preference, that is the values of the gains and losses involved 
in the different decks of cards. Awareness is at Level 1 and decisions appear to be based on 
affective guidance (Bechara et al., 1997; Wagar & Dixon, 2006). Wagar and Dixon (2006) 
consistently showed that around card 20 (the beginning of Block 2: cards 21-40), participants 
began showing an affective preference, as was shown by higher anticipatory GSRs towards the 
good (versus the bad) decks. Moreover, this difference in anticipatory GSRs was strongly 
correlated to a behavioural preference for the good decks in terms of card selections during those 
trials when awareness was still at Level 1 (gut feelings). In addition, participants were still highly 
uncertain about the right strategy in the game during the trials of Block 2 (Maia & McClelland, 
2004; Wagar & Dixon, 2006). We were interested in mood influences on performance in this 
second stage of the game (Block 2), when awareness appears to be at Level 1. Later in the game, 
explicit, Level 2 awareness is acquired about the relative values involved in the four decks of 
cards, enabling participants to explain their preference for the advantageous decks and increasing 
their certainty about the right strategy to play the game (e.g., Bechara et al., 1997; Wagar & 
Dixon, 2006).  
Our main focus was on Block 2 of the IGT. We hypothesized that people in a positive 
mood would outperform people in a negative mood in this second block. We did not expect mood 
effects in any of the other blocks. To test this hypothesis, we had participants play the IGT, after 
measuring (Study 2.1) or manipulating (Studies 2.2 and 2.3) their mood. Because of our a priori 
Chapter 2   
 32 
prediction that mood would be related to IGT performance in Block 2 and not in any of the other 
blocks, we tested our prediction by looking at this specific Block 2 correlation in Study 2.1 or 
contrast in Studies 2.2 and 2.3 (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1985). We also conducted additional 
analyses on the pooled data of the three separate studies, which enabled us to test the robustness of 
mood effects on performance in the IGT in an overall analysis.  
 
Study 2.1 
 
In this first study, we expected that naturally occurring differences in mood would be related to 
performance in Block 2 of the IGT, but not to performance in any of the other blocks.  
Method  
Participants. Fifty-three students from the Radboud University Nijmegen participated. 
They received three euros for their participation of 30 minutes. 
Procedure. The experimenters, who were blind for condition and regarding the hypothesis 
under test, told participants that they would work on two independent studies. First, mood was 
assessed on a computerized 9-point response scale, anchored with ‘not at all’ and ‘very much’. 
This scale consisted of three items (Cronbach’s alpha = .78) to measure positive affect: 1. To what 
extent do you feel happy at the moment? 2. To what extent do you feel positive at the moment? 3. 
To what extent do you feel cheerful at the moment? Mood scores were obtained by calculating the 
mean score for each participant on this scale. After a short, unrelated filler task (drawing a map of 
the campus), the gambling task (IGT) was introduced to participants. We used the original, 
standard version of the IGT (Bechara et al., 1994). Participants were given a loan of €2000, - in 
play money, and had to draw cards from four decks in front of them. Beforehand, the total number 
of cards to be drawn (100) was unknown to the participants. Each card would generate a profit 
and, unpredictably, some cards would also generate a loss. The participants’ task was to play in 
such a way that they would win as much money as possible. Participants had to learn by 
experience which strategy worked best. Playing mostly from the disadvantageous decks would 
lead to an overall loss (€250,- in every ten cards), whereas playing mostly from the advantageous 
decks would lead to an overall gain (€250,- in every ten cards).  
Following a common way to score performance in the IGT, we calculated scores for the 
performance of each participant on the IGT for five consecutive blocks of 20 cards by subtracting 
the number of cards picked from the bad decks from the number of cards picked from the good 
  In the Winning Mood
 33
decks (e.g., Bechara et al., 2000; Evans et al., 2005). The higher a score, the more cards are drawn 
from the advantageous decks. The game lasted approximately 20 minutes. Finally, participants 
were paid, debriefed, and thanked for participation.  
Results and Discussion 
We calculated correlations between mood and the five IGT block scores. In accordance 
with our prediction, mood was found to be significantly related to performance in the second stage 
of the game (block 2: cards 21-40), after experiencing the first losses in the disadvantageous 
decks, r(53) = .35, p < .011. As expected, there were no significant correlations between mood and 
performance in the other blocks (block 1: r(53) = -.08, p < .61; block 3: r(53) = -.03, p < .85; 
block 4: r(53) = -.20, p < .15, & block 5: r(53) = .04, p < .78). These results support our ideas 
concerning the relation between reliance on affective guidance and mood; the more positive their 
mood state, the more cards participants chose from the advantageous decks. In Studies 2.2 and 2.3 
we further explored these ideas by experimentally manipulating mood.  
 
Study 2.2 
 
In Study 2.2, we tested our prediction that mood would influence performance in the IGT. 
Specifically, we predicted that a positive mood would result in better performance in Block 2 of 
the IGT than a negative mood. We did not expect mood effects in any of the other blocks. To test 
our predictions, we first manipulated mood. Next, participants played the IGT. 
Method 
Participants and design. Fifty-two students from the Radboud University Nijmegen were 
randomly assigned to a positive or negative mood condition. For a participation of 30 minutes they 
received 3 euros. 
Mood manipulation. Participants watched a short video clip (2.5 minutes) in order to 
induce either a positive or a negative mood state. In the positive mood condition they watched a 
funny fragment (from the Muppet Show), while in the negative mood condition they watched a 
sad fragment (from Schindler’s List). These film clips have previously been shown to induce the 
mood state intended. After watching the positive mood fragment, participants scored significantly 
higher on a 9 point-mood scale than after watching the negative mood fragment (e.g., De Vries et 
al., 2008b).  
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Procedure. Participants were told that they would be working on two different studies. 
They were given instructions for the “first study”, allegedly concerned with the evaluation of film 
clips, and for the “second study”, the gambling task. Then, the experimenter left the room and 
participants watched the happy or sad video clip. The experimenter, who was blind for condition 
and regarding the hypothesis under test, subsequently re-entered the room and the gambling game 
immediately started. The procedure of the gambling task was identical to Study 2.1. Evaluation of 
the film clips took place at the end of the experiment, after the IGT. Participants were asked 
several questions about the film clip they had watched, such as “How did you like the film clip 
you watched earlier in this experiment?” When probed for suspicion, none of the participants was 
able to identify the goal of this study. 
Results and Discussion 
We tested whether mood influenced choice behaviour in the IGT. In Block 2, mood 
affected the number of cards chosen from the good decks minus the number of cards chosen from 
the bad decks. A t-test revealed that performance in block 2 was better for participants in the 
positive mood condition (M = 6.17) than for participants in the negative mood condition (M = 
1.43), t(50) = 2.14, p < .04, Cohen’s d = .61 (medium to large effect; Cohen, 1992), see Figure 
2.1. Again, as expected, mood did not affect performance in any of the other blocks, (ps > .36). 
Study 2.2 also supported our hypothesis that mood affects performance in the IGT, in the 
early stage of the game. Compared to a negative mood state, a positive mood state enhanced the 
tendency towards choosing cards from the advantageous decks. These results are in line with our 
idea that compared to a negative mood state, a positive mood state results in stronger reliance on 
feelings in decision-making. 
In Study 2.3, we aimed to replicate our findings with the use of a computerized version of 
the IGT. One of the strengths of the IGT is its robustness in face of changes in the way it is 
administered, including whether it is administered manually or in a computerized form (Dunn et 
al., 2006). Use of a computerized version instead of a face-to-face version of the IGT would 
enable us to rule out any possible unwanted influences of the experimenter on the behaviour of 
participants. 
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Figure 2.1. Gambling game performance as a function of mood. In block 2, players in the positive mood condition 
performed significantly better than players in the negative mood condition.  
 
Study 2.3 
 
Again, we predicted that a positive mood would result in better performance in Block 2 of the IGT 
than a negative mood. We did not expect mood effects in any of the other blocks. After a mood 
manipulation, participants played a computerized version of the IGT. 
Method 
Participants and design. Thirty-two students from the Radboud University Nijmegen were 
randomly assigned to a positive or negative mood condition. As in the previous studies, they 
received 3 euros for a participation of 30 minutes. 
Procedure. Study 2.3 only differed from Study 2.2 in the use of a computerized version of 
the IGT instead of a face-to-face version. Except for the way of administration, this version of the 
IGT was similar to the standard, original version that we used in the previous studies. The four 
decks of cards were represented on the computer screen. To pick a card, participants could click 
on one of those four decks. Information on how much money they won by choosing this card 
would then appear in the middle of the screen. If the card they chose also resulted in a loss, 
information about how much money they lost would subsequently appear in the middle of the 
screen. During the game, a green bar in the top of the screen constantly represented the total 
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amount of money, which was updated after every decision. After 100 card pickings, the game 
automatically stopped. Finally, participants were debriefed, paid, and thanked for their 
participation. When probed for suspicion, none of the participants was able to identify the goal of 
this study. 
Results and Discussion 
We aimed to test whether the number of cards chosen from the good decks minus the 
number of cards chosen from the bad decks depended on mood state. Positive mood participants 
again outperformed negative mood participants in block 2 (Ms = 3.55 vs. -1.71), t(30) = 2.30, p < 
.03, Cohen’s d = .65 (medium to large effect; Cohen, 1992), see Figure 2.2. No significant effects 
of mood on performance in blocks 1, 3 and 4 were obtained (ps > .37). Performance in block 5 
was better for participants in the negative mood condition (M = 12.86) than for participants in the 
positive mood condition (M = 5.77), t(30) = 2.88, p < .01, Cohen’s d = .81 (large effect; Cohen, 
1992). Since this result has not been obtained in the previous two studies, caution about its 
interpretation is warranted. A possible explanation for this finding might be that participants in a 
negative mood rely on analytical information processing, and therefore prefer to base their 
decisions on explicit, Level 2 awareness, which has been well established by the end of the game.  
Study 2.3 further illustrates the robustness of the effect of mood on decisions made in 
block 2 of the IGT. We replicated this effect in this study in which a computerized version of the 
IGT was used instead of a face-to-face version. Again, players in a positive mood performed better 
than players in a negative mood in the second stage of the game. By using a computerized version 
of the IGT, we could further standardize our procedure. While the experimenters in Studies 2.1 
and 2.2 were blind for condition and regarding the hypothesis under test and therefore unlikely to 
have had an unwanted influence on the results, use of a computerized version further excludes 
possible influences of the experimenter on the decisions made by participants.  
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Figure 2.2. Gambling game performance as a function of mood. In block 2, players in the positive mood condition 
performed significantly better than players in the negative mood condition. In block 5, players in the negative mood 
condition performed significantly better than players in the positive mood condition.  
 
Additional Analyses 
 
In accordance with our predictions, we consistently found that mood was related to (Study 2.1), or 
influenced (Studies 2.2 and 2.3) performance in Block 2 of the IGT. These results are in line with 
our idea that a positive mood results in stronger reliance on gut feelings in decision-making. 
However, in Study 2.3, we also found that mood influenced performance in Block 5 of the IGT. 
While this result was not expected, it is in accordance with our general line of reasoning on how 
mood influences reliance on feelings and reliance on explanation-based knowledge. To be better 
able to judge how to interpret the results found in the three separate studies, we decided to perform 
additional analyses. By pooling the data of the three separate studies with relatively small numbers 
of participants, we could conduct an overall analysis that would allow us to draw stronger 
conclusions about how mood affects performance in the IGT. Specifically, we aimed to test the 
robustness of the mood effect in block 2 which we found in all studies, and of the mood effect in 
block 5 that we found only in Study 2.3. 
The data of the three studies (N = 137) were pooled and analyzed in the following way. 
First, a correlation matrix for mood and the five IGT block scores was calculated for each study 
separately, with Study as a between subject factor in the design. Since Mood had only two 
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possible scores in Studies 2.2 and 2.3 (i.e., negative or positive), pointbiserial correlations were 
calculated for mood and each of the five IGT block scores in Studies 2.2 and 2.3. Next, we 
conducted a multiple regression analysis on the pooled within group correlations, with the five 
IGT block scores as predictors and mood as the dependent variable. This model significantly 
predicted mood scores, F(5,136) = 3.34, p < .01, R² = .11, Adjusted R² = .08.  
Confirming our main hypothesis, performance in Block 2 was positively correlated with 
mood such that the more positive the mood state of the participant, the better the performance in 
this early stage of the IGT, Beta = .34, t (131) = 3.89, p < .001. None of the other block scores for 
performance in the IGT were significantly related to mood, see Table 1 for an overview of 
regression weights and correlations in our overall multiple regression model. Our finding that the 
relation between choice behaviour in the IGT and mood was significant only in the case of mood 
scores and block 2 implies that there is an interaction between block and mood, which is driven by 
block 2.1 We therefore conclude that mood only influences performance in block 2 of the IGT. 
Performance in the other blocks does not seem to be affected by the mood state that players are in.  
 
Table 1. Regression weights and correlations for IGT performance (Blocks 1-5) with mood in overall analysis on 
pooled data from Studies 2.1-2.3 
 
 Correlations 
Predictor Beta T p Zero-order Partial 
Block 1 -.07 -.85 .40 -.05 -.07 
Block 2 .34 3.89 .00 .30 .32 
Block 3 .00 .01 .99 .05 .00 
Block 4 -.08 -.88 .38 -.04 -.08 
Block 5 -.07 -.77 .44 -.05 -.07 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The interaction between block and mood was also tested with repeated measures analyses of variance with mood as 
the between subjects factor (Studies 2.2 and 2.3) or as a continuous factor (Study 2.1) and block as the repeated 
measures factor. These analyses showed the same statistically significant interaction between mood and block. 
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General discussion 
 
In three studies, we investigated the role of mood in the Iowa Gambling Task and demonstrated 
that mood affects performance on the IGT. We showed that naturally occurring differences in 
mood states (Study 2.1) as well as experimental manipulations of mood states (Studies 2.2 and 
2.3), influenced decisions about card selections in the IGT. We consistently found that at an early 
stage of the IGT, after experiencing the first losses in the bad decks, participants in a happy mood 
state outperformed participants in a sad mood state. An additional analysis on the pooled data of 
the three reported studies confirmed that in block 2 of the IGT, people in a happy mood state 
chose more cards from the advantageous decks than people in a negative mood state.  
We interpret our findings in terms of mood influencing reliance on affective signals in 
decision-making. In previous studies using the IGT, others (e.g., Bechara et al., 1997; Wagar & 
Dixon, 2006) have shown that players may base their decisions on affective signals towards 
decision alternatives during an early stage of the game, that is, before players are able to explain 
which alternatives are best. We focused on one of the factors that may facilitate or inhibit reliance 
on affective signals in decision-making. We suggest that an individual’s mood state functions as a 
moderator of the type of process that guides decision-making. Specifically, in a happy mood state, 
people probably rely more strongly on affective reactions toward different decision-options, 
whereas in a sad mood state, people adopt a more careful, analytical decision-strategy. 
Our research advances on studies concerning the link between mood and cognitive 
processing styles (e.g., Bless & Schwarz, 1999). We provide empirical evidence for the influence 
of mood on behavioural responses in a laboratory task that models decision-making under 
uncertainty. Previous studies showed that, compared to a negative mood state, a positive mood 
enhances reliance on general knowledge structures. The present studies suggest that, compared to 
a negative mood state, a positive mood state may increase reliance on affective cues as well.  
While our results show that a positive mood can lead to better decisions than a negative 
mood, one should not infer that this always holds true. Whether a positive mood results in better 
decisions than a negative mood might largely depend on the decision task at hand. Several factors 
might play an important role here, and in future research several hypotheses with regard to such 
factors could be studied. For example, when faced with a decision task that requires decision-
makers to follow strict rules in order to make good decisions, reliance on affective reactions might 
cause distractions from the optimal, analytical strategy (e.g., Shiv et al., 2005; see also 
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Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & Van Baaren, 2006). In such cases, a sad mood seems to be more 
adaptive, because it may lead decision-makers to rely on their deliberations.  
On the other hand, thinking too much can sometimes result in less optimal preferences and 
decisions and reduce satisfaction with decision-outcomes (Wilson et al., 1993; Wilson, 2002). Sad 
decision-makers might sometimes suffer from overanalyzing reasons for their preferences, 
resulting in suboptimal decision-outcomes. Another factor that might be important is the 
complexity of the task. Some recent findings suggest that thoughtful deliberation is not necessarily 
the best strategy when decision-tasks are complex in terms of the amount of information involved 
(e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004; Wilson, 2002). Finally, mood can influence the subjective quality of 
decision-outcomes through its fit versus non-fit with a decision-strategy, with a negative mood 
resulting in a better subjective quality when a deliberative decision-strategy is applied and a 
positive mood resulting in a better subjective value when an affect-based, intuitive decision-
strategy is applied (De Vries et al., 2008b). 
To conclude, we believe that the mood state of the decision-maker can affect both the 
process and the quality of decisions, but that there is no “right mood” for decision-making in 
general. Our studies showed that, in an early stage of the Iowa Gambling Task, a positive mood is 
the winning mood. 
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Abstract 
 
We investigated the influence of sad and happy mood states on decision tasks that require the 
application of a simple, logical rule to make advantageous decisions. Participants made a series 
of investment decisions (Study 3.1) or a series of gambling decisions (Study 3.2) after a sad or 
after a happy mood manipulation. In both studies, participants made more logical decisions, in 
accordance with a simple rule, after a sad than after a happy mood manipulation. We conclude 
that sad and happy mood states that are incidentally induced have different impacts on simple, 
rule-based decision making.  
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Decision making, mood, rule-based decision strategy, investment behaviour, gambling 
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Introduction 
 
Imagine that you are asked to make gambling decisions involving the following rule: In gamble 
A, you have a 50% chance of winning €1.00 and a 50% chance to win nothing. In gamble B, you 
have a 50% chance of winning €1.20 and a 50% chance to win nothing. The traditionally 
dominant view of decision making has been that decision makers should calculate expected 
values, or expected utilities, for the various decision options under consideration and 
subsequently choose the options with the best expected outcome. Decision making was assumed 
to be a predominantly cognitive process, in which affect only plays a small role, or at best 
negatively influences decision-making by causing distraction of a rational and optimal strategy. 
To maximize the expected outcome in the example given, you should always choose gamble B. If 
individuals would make fully logical decisions, they would always follow this simple, logical 
rule. However, individuals do not always rely on logic in decision making. 
Recently, there has been a growing interest in the role of affect in decision making (e.g., 
Cohen & Blum, 2002; Damasio, 1994; Harlé & Sanfey, 2007; Kahneman, 2003; LeDoux, 1996; 
Peters & Slovic, 2000; Winkielman, Knutson, Paulus, & Trujillo, 2007). Research has examined 
the role of anticipatory as well as incidental affect (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). Consideration 
of the different decision options at hand can result in affective reactions, or anticipatory affect 
that is experienced at the time of decision making. However, this first approach does not take into 
account the influence of incidental affect, arising from factors unrelated to the decision. 
Incidental affect includes the dispositional as well as temporally induced mood state of the 
decision maker, an omnipresent factor in human decision making, naturally fluctuating as a 
function of good and bad experiences in our daily lives, including seemingly unrelated factors 
such as the weather conditions. Incidental affect can influence decision making in various ways, 
such as by altering the decision maker’s perception of the desirability or probability of outcomes, 
by biasing perception, attention and memory in an affect-congruent way, or by affecting the 
nature and depth of information processing (e.g., Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; Schwarz & Clore, 
2007; Winkielman et al., 2007). Research on the role of incidental affect in decision making has 
not yet addressed the hypothesis that the mood state of a decision maker is a moderator of 
decision strategies in simple, rule-based decision tasks. We aim to test this hypothesis.  
Although normative models of decision making assume that decision makers have 
complete information about the values and probabilities attached to different decision options, 
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that they understand this information, and use it to calculate and compare the advantages and 
disadvantages of each decision option (e.g., Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947), actual 
decision making often deviates from these assumptions (e.g., Kahneman, 2003; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). When making a decision, individuals can use various strategies and rely on 
different ways of information processing. Which strategy is best seems to depend on the decision 
task at hand (e.g., Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994). One important dimension appears to be the 
complexity of the decision task (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004; Wilson, 2002).  
Here, we focus on simple decision tasks in which it is beneficial to use a deliberative, 
rule-based decision strategy. Dijksterhuis and colleagues (2006) showed that when decision tasks 
are simple, a deliberative, rule-based decision strategy is best. Another recent study showed that 
in a task requiring the application of a simple, logical rule, a lack of emotional reactions lead to 
more advantageous decisions (Shiv, Loewenstein, Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2005). Mental 
states that facilitate rule-based processing may therefore enhance performance on this task. A sad 
mood state may precisely trigger such a mental state.  
Mood states can be defined as relatively long-lasting diffuse affective states, or 
background feelings (Frijda, 1986; Russell, 2003). Inspired by empirical evidence for the 
influence of mood state on information processing (e.g., Bless & Schwarz, 1999; Fiedler, 1988; 
Schwarz & Clore, 2007; see Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994 for a review; see Martin & Clore, 
2001 for a discussion of theoretical accounts), we aim to test whether individuals in a sad mood 
state are more likely to base their decisions on a simple, logical rule than individuals in a happy 
mood state. This seems plausible, since mood has been shown to influence the scope (i.e., breadth 
or narrowness) of perceptual as well as conceptual attention. In a negative mood state, individuals 
adopt a narrower focus than in a positive mood state (Derryberry & Tucker, 1994; Isen, 2000). 
Such a narrow focus might facilitate rule-based decision making. Sticking to a logical rule 
requires cognitive control and serial rather than parallel processing of information. In terms of 
dual-processing models of judgment and decision making (e.g., Evans, 2008), in a sad mood, 
individuals are more likely to engage in analytical and serial (System 2) processing than 
individuals in a happy mood, who are more likely to engage in intuitive, parallel (System 1) 
processing. As sticking to a logical decision rule is a typical System 2 process, we expect sad 
decision makers to be more likely to do so than decision makers in a happy mood state. 
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The current research 
We tested the impact of happy versus sad mood states on rule-based decision making. In 
Study 3.1, we used a decision task that was closely modelled on the investment task developed by 
Shiv and colleagues (2005). For Study 3.2, we designed a new decision task, the Radboud 
University Logic versus Experience (RULE) game, to further investigate the extent to which 
individuals base their decisions on a simple, logical rule. We expected that mood state would 
influence performance on these tasks, which require decision makers to follow a simple, logical 
rule to make good decisions. Specifically, we expected that sad decision makers would 
outperform happy decision makers.  
 
Study 3.1 
 
Method 
Participants and Design. Forty-eight students from the Radboud University Nijmegen 
participated in exchange for a monetary reward. They were randomly assigned to either a happy 
or a sad mood condition. Seven participants were excluded form the analyses because they made 
the same response on each investment trial. This was unaffected by mood condition.  
Materials and Procedure. Participants were welcomed and informed that the study 
consisted of several short and different parts, including an investment game and a part allegedly 
on media evaluation. They were first given the instructions for the investment game. Next, they 
watched a short video clip (from the Muppet Show or from Schindler’s List). Manipulation 
checks have consistently shown that these film clips indeed induce the intended mood states (e.g., 
De Vries, Holland, & Witteman, 2008b). After the video clip, the instructions for the investment 
game (Shiv et al., 2005) were briefly repeated.   
Participants were told that they would be making several rounds of investment decisions. 
We provided information about the values and probabilities for the two decision options per 
round. At each decision round, or trial, participants received a facsimile €10 bill and could decide 
whether or not they wanted to invest €10. Each time participants decided not to invest, they could 
keep the €10. Each time participants decided to invest, they handed over €10 to the experimenter 
and had a 50% chance of winning €25, but also a 50% chance of winning nothing. So, the 
expected outcome was €12.5 per trial for investment and €10 for non-investment, making 
investment the rational choice in this task. The more participants would stick to this rule, the 
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more often they would decide to invest rather than keep €10. Each time a participant chose to 
invest, a coin was flipped by the experimenter to determine the outcome. Unknown to 
participants, the game ended after 20 trials. Following others (e.g., Shiv et al., 2005), we scored 
decisions made by participants by calculating the mean percentages of trials in which participants 
decided to invest for four successive blocks of five trials. The experimenter was blind for the 
hypothesis under test.  
Results and discussion 
 Preliminary analyses. In replication of previous findings (Shiv et al., 2005), we found 
that participants invested in the majority of trials (72%). This percentage gradually decreased 
over the course of the game. In the first as well as in the second block of five trials, participants 
decided to invest on 75% of trials on average, in the third block they decided to invest on 70% of 
trials, and in the last block on 68% of trials. 
 Main analyses. We expected that, compared to happy decision makers, sad decision 
makers would more often follow the simple rule that based on expected outcomes it is best to 
invest. The results for the first block of five investment decisions were in line with our prediction. 
In the happy mood condition, participants decided to invest in 63% of trials on average, whereas 
in the sad mood condition, participants decided to invest in 77% of trials on average, t(39) = 2.05, 
p < .05, Cohen’s d = .66. Mood state did not influence investment decisions in the other three 
blocks, p´s > .48.  
The main result of this study is in line with our general idea that the mood state of a 
decision maker influences reliance on rule-based decision making. A sad mood manipulation 
increased the number of decisions to invest in the first block of trials in the game. So, after a sad 
mood manipulation, individuals made more rational investment decisions, in line with a simple, 
logical rule, than after a happy mood manipulation. Mood state did not influence gambling 
decisions in later blocks. A sad mood state resulted in good decisions in the first block, which 
might have improved the mood state of those sad participants, which in turn might have changed 
their decision strategy during the rest of the game. We addressed this point in our second study. 
Study 3.2 employed a task in which outcomes were the same for each participant. This way, 
decision outcomes would not differentially influence subsequent mood states and thus decision 
strategy over the course of the game. Moreover, a mood manipulation check was included.  
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Study 3.2 
 
The second study served several objectives. First, we aimed to replicate the obtained mood state 
effect using a different decision task. Moreover, in Study 3.1, we did not test whether participants 
actually understood the rule. It is possible that not all participants did, and therefore they could 
not base their decisions on the rule. Note that we only expected mood impacts on the use of 
logical rules, and not on the understanding of such rules. Therefore, we now included an 
assessment of understanding of the rule. Finally, outcomes were the same for all participants and 
we included a mood manipulation check at the end of the game.  
Method 
Participants and Design. 105 students of the Radboud University Nijmegen participated 
in exchange for money and were randomly assigned to either a happy or a sad mood condition.  
Materials and Procedure. The full study was computerized. Participants were informed 
that the study consisted of several parts and were first given the instructions for the gambling 
game. Next, participants watched a funny fragment from Jungle Book or a sad fragment from 
Sophie’s Choice. After the video clip, the RULE game immediately started.   
Participants made a series of choices between the following two gambles: In gamble A, 
they had a 50% chance of winning nothing and a 50% chance of winning €1.20. In gamble B, 
they had a 50% chance of winning nothing and a 50% chance of winning €1.00. To increase 
involvement, participants had a chance to actually receive the money they would win in a lottery. 
We counterbalanced (between participants) whether Gamble A or Gamble B was the gamble with 
the highest expected outcome.  
We manipulated gamble outcomes in the following way: The first two trials in which 
participants chose the best gamble, they won. From the third trial onwards, participants did not 
win anything anymore. Our main dependent variable was the number of trials on which 
participants opted for the best gamble. Immediately after opting for the worst gamble, or after 20 
trials (whichever came first), we asked participants to explain their choices.  
After the RULE game, mood was measured on a 10-point scale, anchored with ‘not at all’ 
and ‘very much’. This scale, which served as our manipulation check, consisted of six (alpha = 
.95) items, such as ‘To what extent do you feel happy right now?’ We also checked 
understanding of the logical rule by asking them the following open ended question: ‘In gamble 
A, there is a 50% chance of winning nothing and a 50% chance of winning €1.20. In gamble B, 
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there is a 50% chance of winning nothing and a 50% chance of winning €1.00. Please, explain 
what you see as the right strategy to play this game.’ The experimenter was blind for condition 
and for the hypothesis under test.  
Results and discussion 
 Mood manipulation check. Participant’s mood state was indeed significantly more happy 
after watching a fragment from Jungle Book (M = 7.71) than after watching a fragment from 
Sophie’s Choice (M = 5.47), t(103) = 7.47, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.47. 
Other preliminary analyses. Our assessment of participants’ understanding of the rule 
showed that the majority of participants did (65.7%, N = 69). Understanding was not affected by 
mood state, 36 out of 53 participants in the happy mood condition and 33 out of 52 participants in 
the sad mood condition understood that it was best to always choose the game with 50% chance 
to win 1.20, because this game had the highest expected value, Chi-squared (104, N = 105) = 
1.13, p < .57. Since we were interested in the effect of mood state on the extent to which 
individuals follow a rule in decision making, our main analyses are based on the data of those 
participants who actually did understand the rational rule.  
Main analyses. In line with our expectation, results showed that in a sad mood state, 
individuals stuck to the logical rule longer and more often chose the option with the higher 
expected value (M = 13.55 trials) than in a happy mood state (M = 9.81 trials), t(67) = 2.57, p < 
.02, Cohen’s d = .63.2 Importantly, participants’ understanding of the rule was not affected by 
mood. Thus, it is not the case that happy participants understand less what is at stake; they 
understand the rule but simply do not follow it as strictly as sad participants. When explaining 
their choice for the worse gamble, participants typically answered that it was because they had 
not won any money during the last few trials, but that they knew they should have opted for the 
best gamble again. One of the participants explained this in the following way: ‘Yeah, that was 
stupid… I should have chosen the other gamble of course… but I had not won anything for a 
while…’. 
 
 
                                                 
2 Excluding those participants who chose the best game on all 20 trials yields the same, significant pattern of results. 
In the sad mood condition, the proportion of participants who always chose the best game was 11 out of 33, whereas 
in the happy mood condition, this was 6 out of 36, Chi squared  (68, N  = 69) = 2.58, p < .11.  
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General Discussion 
 
In two studies, we found support for our idea that in a sad mood state, individuals stick to an 
advantageous rule-based decision strategy longer than in a happy mood state. In both studies, sad 
individuals made more rational decisions than happy individuals. The second study showed that 
mood state did not influence understanding of the rule itself. In a sad mood state, participants just 
stuck to the logical rule longer.  
These findings advance on previous insight into the impact of mood states on decision 
strategies. In a recent study manipulating mood state and affect-based versus cognition-based, 
deliberative decision strategies, we found that a happy mood state matched well with affect-based 
decision making, whereas a sad mood state matched well with deliberative decision making (De 
Vries et al., 2008b). In another line of research, we found that in a complex task, happy mood 
individuals appeared to rely on their gut feelings more and outperformed sad mood individuals 
(De Vries, Holland, & Witteman, 2008a). Other recent studies show that negative affect 
decreases automatic reactions to affective stimuli (Vermeulen, Corneille, & Luminet, 2007; 
Vermeulen, Luminet, & Corneille, 2006). The current results show the complement: In a simple 
decision task, sad mood individuals appear to more strongly rely on a logical rule and outperform 
happy mood individuals.  
Since reliance on different decision strategies may affect the quality of decision outcomes, 
it is important to gain more insight in the factors that influence which strategy individuals use. 
When decision tasks are relatively simple, deliberation has been shown to result in better 
outcomes than intuition. A sad mood state results in more deliberation and consequently better 
decisions than a happy mood state. Our finding can be interpreted as sad decision makers being 
smarter or wiser in simple tasks. Indeed, in such tasks it is profitable for decision makers to stick 
to logical rules that increase expected outcomes, even in the face of temporal failures. If for 
example investors, consumers, or psychologists need to follow a strict rule to make the best 
decisions, it appears to be wise to be sad.  
However, we live in an uncertain world and we often cannot be sure about the expected 
outcomes of different decision options. When negative outcomes persist, it might actually be a 
viable strategy to deviate from a seemingly logical rule and try alternative strategies that are not 
fully understood yet by logic. In a dynamic and uncertain world, individuals in a happy mood 
state might often profit from their open-minded and creative processing style (e.g., Isen, 
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Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987), testing new and innovative solutions when an established strategy 
fails. From this perspective, in a gambling game in which you understand the logical rule, but 
keep experiencing bad outcomes when applying it, switching might actually be a viable strategy.  
To conclude, our studies advance insight in the role of affect in decision making. Mood 
influences the way individuals make decisions, but there seems to be no straightforward answer 
to the question which mood state is most advantageous. We believe that there is no right mood in 
general. Our mood states naturally fluctuate, constantly influencing the way we process 
information and make decisions. This dynamic system gives us different perspectives on the 
world and on the decision tasks we face, enabling us to constantly adapt to new outcomes and 
experiences. Focusing on the mood state of decision maker is a fruitful avenue for future research 
into the role of affect in decision making, furthering our understanding of the interplay of affect 
and cognition. Depending on factors such as the complexity of the decision task, it can be 
advantageous to be simply sad, but also to be holistically happy.    
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Abstract 
 
We investigated the influence of the compatibility between mood and decision-strategies on the 
subjective value of a decision-outcome. Several studies have provided evidence for the idea that a 
sad mood induces people to analyze information carefully, probably fitting well with a 
deliberative decision-strategy. In a happy mood, people tend to more strongly act on their 
feelings, probably fitting well with an intuitive decision-strategy. However, sometimes the 
situation demands the use of decision-strategies that seem incompatible with mood states. We 
expected that decision-makers would value a decision-outcome higher in case of a fit between 
mood and decision-strategy than in case of a non-fit. After a mood manipulation, participants 
were instructed to decide either based on their first affective reaction or after deliberation. Results 
confirmed our expectations: Fitting decisions enhanced the subjective value of a decision-
outcome.  
 
Keywords: Decision-making, mood, decision-strategies, fit, intuition 
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Introduction 
 
When people make a choice between different alternatives, one thing they can do is rely on their 
intuition, that is, base their decision on the first affective reactions that come to mind. They could 
also decide deliberately, i.e. analyze the pros and cons of different options before making a 
decision. Irrespective of the outcome itself, such intuitive versus deliberative decision-strategies 
may influence how much people value their decision-outcome (see also e.g., Avnet & Higgins, 
2006).  
According to Higgins, Idson, Freitas, Spiegel, and Molden (2003), when people “feel 
right” about a strategy they are using, they experience value. This value transfers to the chosen 
outcome. Linking these ideas to intuition versus deliberation, it is important to know when it 
feels right to rely on feelings and when it feels right to thoroughly deliberate before deciding. We 
focus on mood as a potential moderator. We define mood states as diffuse affective states that are 
not linked to specific stimuli and that are relatively long-lasting (see e.g., Frijda, 1986). We focus 
on whether choosing in a way that fits a person’s mood state makes them value a chosen 
alternative more. 
Mood and intuitive versus deliberative decision-making 
Deliberative decision-making is cognition-based, rule-governed, analytical, precise and 
slow. Deliberating decision-makers take their time to thoroughly analyze the positive and 
negative aspects of different options. Such deliberate decision-making can be contrasted to 
intuitive decision-making, which is characterized by a sense that something is right or wrong, or 
that one option is better than another, without necessarily being able to explain where this “gut 
feeling” or intuition comes from. We understand intuitive decision-making as decision-making 
based on this kind of feelings (see also e.g., Kahneman, 2003; Lieberman, 2000). 
Interestingly, the degree to which people process information deliberatively or intuitively 
has been found to depend on affective states. Advancing on dual-process models of information 
processing, it has been shown that in a sad mood, individuals are more likely to deliberate than in 
a happy mood (e.g., see Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994 for a review; see Martin & Clore, 2001 
for a discussion of theoretical accounts). For example, Fiedler (1988) has shown that in a sad 
mood, people produce fewer inconsistencies in a multiattribute decision task than in a happy 
mood. Moreover, several studies have shown a differential impact of argument strength under 
different mood states (see e.g., Bless & Schwarz, 1999 for a review). That is, in a sad mood 
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individuals are more likely to engage in systematic elaboration than in a happy mood. Hence, sad 
individuals are strongly persuaded by strong arguments, but not by weak arguments, whereas 
happy individuals are moderately persuaded by strong as well as weak arguments.  
Furthermore, there is some evidence that happy mood individuals respond more 
intuitively than those in a sad mood (e.g., Bolte, Goschke, & Kuhl, 2003; Isen & Means, 1983). 
For example, mood influences the ability to make intuitive judgments (Bolte et al., 2003). Happy 
individuals outperformed sad individuals in intuitively judging whether or not word triads (e.g., 
“playing, credit, report”) were coherent, i.e., had a common weak associate (“card”) that they 
were not consciously aware of. A happy mood induces a heuristic, intuitive mindset, probably 
fitting well with intuitive decision-making, but less well with deliberate decisions. A sad mood, 
on the contrary, induces a deliberative mindset, with fitting decisions most likely made 
deliberatively, after thoroughly analyzing the pros and cons. 
Fitting decisions 
The mood state of the decision-maker may not always match the manner in which the 
decision-maker decides. This might seem strange at first sight. Why would decision-makers in a 
happy mood not base their decisions on their first feelings if that is what feels like the right thing 
to do for them? And likewise, could not sad decision-makers simply base their decisions on 
thoroughly analyzing the positive and negative aspects of various options? The answer is no, not 
always. Sometimes, the situation demands the use of another strategy. For example, a decision-
maker in a sad mood may not have enough time to deliberate extensively before making a 
decision. Or happy mood decision-makers may need to carefully deliberate before they decide, 
because they have to justify their decision. Hence, the decision-strategy we use may not always 
fit our current mood state. Recent studies suggest that such a fit or non-fit may have important 
consequences for the subjective value of the decision-outcome (e.g., Avnet & Higgins, 2003; 
Higgins et al., 2003). 
Most studies on fit have been conducted in the domain of regulatory focus. Promotion 
oriented people are generally concerned with the presence or absence of positive outcomes, and 
prevention oriented individuals with the presence or absence of negative outcomes. Higgins and 
colleagues (2003) had participants make a choice between a mug and a pen they would receive as 
a gift. That is, half of the participants were told to think about what they would gain by choosing 
the mug and what they would gain by choosing the pen. The other half was instructed to think 
about what they would lose by not choosing the mug and what they would lose by not choosing 
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the pen. Results showed that promotion oriented individuals valued the chosen outcome higher 
when they focused on gains (fit) rather than losses (non-fit). In contrast, prevention oriented 
individuals valued their decision-outcome more when they focused on losses rather than gains. 
In addition, some recent studies have shown that a fit-effect can also be caused by a match 
between situationally induced information processing-styles and instructed decision-strategies 
(Avnet & Higgins, 2003; Förster & Higgins, 2005). For example, focusing on a whole rather than 
on parts (global processing) fits a choice strategy that focuses on gains. In contrast, focusing on 
parts (local processing) fits a choice strategy focusing on losses. A fit between information 
processing-style and choice strategy resulted in a higher subjective value of the chosen object 
than a non-fit (Förster & Higgins, 2005).  
In short, several studies have illustrated fit-effects in decision-making. However, fit-
effects as a function of mood have not been studied yet. Moreover, little is known about fit-
effects with intuitive versus deliberative decision-strategies. This is surprising, given the 
centrality of the distinction between deciding based on feelings versus analytical thought in 
psychology and decision-making research (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004, Wilson, 2002). Very recently, 
Betsch & Kunz (2008) showed a fit-effect of intuitive versus deliberative decision-strategies with 
dispositional preferences for intuitive versus deliberative decision-making. Intuitive decision-
makers generally prefer to decide based on their feelings. In contrast, deliberative decision-
makers have a stable preference for decision-making based on thoroughly analyzing the pros and 
cons of various decision options. Individuals were classified according to their preferences for 
intuitive and deliberative decision-making. When the dispositionally preferred decision-mode 
matched an instructed decision strategy (intuitive vs. deliberative), the perceived value of a 
chosen object was higher than in case of a non-match (see also Avnet & Higgins, 2006). 
The present study 
The primary goal of our study was to investigate whether fit-effects could be obtained by 
manipulating both people’s mood states and their decision-strategies. We expected to obtain fit-
effects when a mood manipulation is crossed with a decision-strategy manipulation. A happy 
mood state is compatible with intuitive decision-making, and a sad mood state with thoughtful, 
deliberative decision-making. Thus far it is unknown whether and how this compatibility, or fit, 
between mood states and decision-strategies influences decision-making. We aimed to investigate 
the consequences of such a fit for the subjective value of a decision-outcome. We hypothesized 
that intuitive decision-making in a happy mood and deliberative decision-making in a sad mood 
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would result in a higher subjective value of a chosen object than intuitive decision-making in a 
sad mood and deliberative decision-making in a happy mood state.  
Second, following recent research by Betsch and Kunz (2008), we aimed to demonstrate a 
second fit-effect with intuitive versus deliberative decision-strategies by focusing on dispositional 
preferences for such decision-strategies (Betsch, 2004). In case of a match between these stable, 
dispositional preferences and an instructed decision-mode, we expected to replicate a fit-effect, 
i.e. enhanced subjective value of a chosen alternative (cf. Betsch and Kunz, 2008). Specifically, 
intuitive decision-makers who decide based on their first feelings and deliberative decision-
makers who decide deliberatively are expected to value their chosen object higher than intuitive 
decision-makers deciding deliberatively and deliberative decision-makers basing their decision 
on their first feeling. 
 
Method 
 
Overview  
First, we manipulated mood. Next, participants made a decision, either intuitively or 
deliberatively, which of two different looking thermoses they would like to win in a lottery. 
Subsequently, participants estimated the value of the chosen thermos. Finally, we measured 
mood and preferences for intuitive and deliberative decision-strategies.  
Participants and Design 
Participants were 77 students (51 female, 26 male) from the Radboud University 
Nijmegen. They were randomly assigned to conditions in the 2 (Mood: happy vs. sad) x 2 
(Decision-strategy: intuitive vs. deliberative) between-subjects design.  
Materials and Procedure  
Participants were led to individual cubicles. The experimenter, who was blind for 
hypothesis and condition, explained that all the instructions would be given on the computer 
screen and left the room. Participants were informed that the study consisted of several short and 
different parts and that a thermos would be raffled between all participants. In the first part, 
allegedly on media evaluation, they watched a short video clip (2,5 minutes), meant to elicit 
either a happy or a sad mood state. In the happy-mood condition participants watched a funny 
fragment (from the Muppet Show), in the sad-mood condition they watched a sad fragment (from 
Schindler’s List).  
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The next part was the lottery (Betsch & Kunz, 2008). Participants saw pictures of two 
different thermoses. Decision-mode was manipulated. In the intuitive choice condition, 
participants were asked “Based on your first feelings, please indicate which of the two thermoses 
you prefer to win in the lottery.” The instruction for participants in the deliberate choice 
condition was as follows: “Please have a close look at the thermoses and think of the pros and 
cons for each thermos. Take your time. Next, please indicate which of the two thermoses you 
prefer to win in the lottery.” Right after the choice had been made, all participants estimated the 
monetary value of the chosen thermos (in Euros). This measure of subjective value of the chosen 
alternative served as our main dependent variable. 
After the lottery, mood was measured on a 9-point scale, anchored with ‘not at all’ and 
‘very much’, consisting of five items (Cronbach’s alpha = .95), e.g., “To what extent do you feel 
happy at the moment?”. Then, participants filled in the Preference for Intuition and Deliberation 
(PID) questionnaire (Betsch, 2004) in order to measure preferences for intuitive and deliberative 
decision-making strategies. This questionnaire comprises 18 items, nine indicating the preference 
for intuition (Cronbach’s alpha = .79), e.g., “I listen carefully to my deepest feelings”, nine other 
items indicating the preference for deliberation (Cronbach’s alpha = .82), e.g., “I prefer making 
detailed plans rather than leaving things to chance”. Preference for intuition and preference for 
deliberation were not correlated, r(77) = - .15, ns. Based on these data participants were classified 
as intuitive when they scored above the median on the intuition scale and below the median on 
the deliberation scale, and as deliberative when they scored above the median on the deliberation 
and below the median on the intuition scale. In this way, clear groups were created (Betsch, 
2004; Betsch & Kunz, 2008). Finally, participants were debriefed, paid, and thanked for their 
participation.  
 
Results 
 
Manipulation checks 
In all analyses, gender was included as an additional factor. No effects involving gender 
were significant. In order to test whether the video clips induced the intended mood states, a 2 
(Mood Condition: happy vs. sad) x 2 (Decision-Mode: intuitive vs. deliberative) analysis of 
variance with reported mood as dependent variable was conducted. The main effect of Mood 
Condition was significant, F(1,76) = 26.41, MSE = 1.44, p < .001. Participants’ mood was 
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significantly more happy after watching a funny video fragment (M = 6.65, SD = .20) than after 
watching a sad video fragment (M = 5.11, SD = .23). No other effects were found, F’s < 1.  
In order to test whether the instruction to decide intuitively versus deliberatively 
successfully influenced the way participants made their decision, a 2 (Mood Condition) x 2 
(Decision-Mode) analysis of variance with the time taken to make a decision (in seconds) as 
dependent variable was conducted. The main effect of Decision-Mode was significant, F(1,76) = 
47.43, MSE = 129.41, p < .001. Deciding took longer in the deliberative (M = 26.00, SD = 1.88) 
than in the intuitive (M = 6.40, SD = 2.14) Decision-Mode condition. No other effects were 
found, F’s < 1. 
Fitting decisions: Mood and intuitive versus deliberative decision-strategies 
We had predicted that, compared to a non-match, a match between mood and the 
instructed decision-mode would result in a higher price assigned to the chosen thermos. In 
accordance with our prediction, a 2 (Mood Condition) x 2 (Decision-Mode) analysis of variance 
with estimated price as dependent variable yielded a significant Mood Condition x Decision-
Mode interaction, F(1,76) = 5.04, MSE = 23.63, p < .03. When mood state fit with decision-
mode, the estimated price was significantly higher than when mood state did not fit with 
decision-mode, see Figure 4.1. Specifically, making a choice based on first feelings in a happy 
mood, or after thinking of pros and cons in a sad mood, led to a higher estimated value of the 
chosen thermos than making an affect-based choice in a sad mood, or a thought-based choice in a 
happy mood.3 No main effects were obtained, F’s < 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Simple effect tests showed a marginal significant Mood effect for the deliberative decision-mode, F(1,73) = 3.48, 
MSE  =  23.56, p <.07 and no effect for the intuitive decision-mode, F < 1. 
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Figure 4.1. Subjective value of chosen object as a function of Mood and Decision-Mode. 
 
Fitting decisions: Dispositional preferences and intuitive versus deliberative decision-strategies 
The following results are based on the data of those participants who were classified in 
the clear groups, i.e. unambiguously as either intuitive (N = 22) or deliberative (N = 25) decision-
makers, following the classification method by Betsch and Kunz (2008). It is important to note 
that, since we measured dispositional preferences at the end of our study, scores on those 
dispositional scales were not affected by our manipulated variables, i.e. Mood and Decision-
Mode. No main effects were found, F’s < 1, and the interactions were not significant, F(1,76) = 
2.39, MSE = .33 for Preference for Intuition, and F(1,76) = 1.87, MSE = .33 for Preference for 
Deliberation. 
A 2 (Preferred Decision-Mode: intuitive vs. deliberative) x 2 (Instructed Decision-Mode: 
intuitive vs. deliberative) x 2 (Mood Condition: happy vs. sad) analysis of variance with 
estimated price as the dependent variable yielded a significant Preferred Decision-Mode x 
Instructed Decision-Mode interaction, F(1, 46) = 5.06, MSE = 19.46, p < .04. Participants with a 
dispositional preference for intuitive decision-making who were instructed to make an intuitive 
decision and those with a dispositional preference for deliberative decision-making and the 
instruction to make a deliberative decision experienced fit. Those participants assigned a higher 
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value to the chosen thermos than participants who did not experience fit, see Figure 4.2.4 No 
further effects were obtained. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Subjective value of chosen object as a function of Dispositional Preference and Decision-Mode. 
 
Discussion 
 
The main purpose of this article was to investigate fit-effects between mood states and intuitive 
versus deliberative decision-strategies. Our study illustrated that in case of a fit between mood 
and decision-strategy, the subjective value of the outcome of a decision process is higher than in 
case of a non-fit. Deciding intuitively in a happy mood state or deliberatively in a sad mood state 
resulted in a higher subjective value of the chosen outcome than deciding intuitively in a sad 
mood state or deliberatively in a happy mood state. Moreover, we found evidence for a second 
type of fitting decisions. People with a dispositional preference for intuitive decision-making 
value their decision-outcomes more when they base their choices on their first affective reaction 
                                                 
4 Simple effect tests showed a marginal significant Dispositional Preference effect for the intuitive decision-mode, 
F(1,39) = 3.22, MSE  =  20.98, p <.09 and no effect for the deliberative decision-mode, F(1,39)  = 2.79, MSE  = 
20.98. 
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
intuitive
decision
deliberative
decision
Su
bj
ec
tiv
e 
va
lu
e 
(e
ur
o)
intuitives
deliberatives
    Fitting Decisions   
 69
towards the choice options. In contrast, deliberation on pros and cons enhances the perceived 
value of decision-outcomes in people with a stable preference for deliberative decision-making 
(cf. Betsch & Kunz, 2008). 
Our study contributes to the discussion of the role of mood in judgment and decision-
making. First, although mood can alter decision-outcomes by means of several processes (see for 
an overview Schwarz & Clore, 2007), our study is the first to show that mood affects decision-
outcomes via its fit or non-fit with the way in which a decision is made. Second, whereas the link 
between negative mood and deliberative, analytical processing has been demonstrated repeatedly 
(e.g., Fiedler, 1988), the relation between positive mood and intuitive processing has so far 
received far less attention (see for an exception e.g., Bolte et al., 2003). Although the influence of 
mood on reliance on heuristics and general knowledge structures has been well established (see 
e.g., Bless & Schwarz, 1999), previous studies do not speak to the idea that positive mood states 
can also influence reliance on affective reactions towards decision-options. The current results 
are in line with recent findings obtained in our lab showing that positive mood individuals are 
more likely to rely on the first feelings that come to mind (De Vries, Holland, & Witteman, 
2008a). 
Our results also extend previous research on fit-effects in several ways. First, most studies 
have focused on regulatory focus. Our study may be added to the few studies (e.g., Avnet & 
Higgins, 2003) that obtained fit-effects outside this domain. Together with these previous 
findings, our study shows that fit-effects can be considered a broader phenomenon than 
regulatory fit only. Second, the fact that we studied fit-effects employing a mood manipulation 
has implications for understanding the nature of fit-effects, or at least for understanding what fit 
is not. According to Higgins and colleagues (2003), fit-effects are distinct from general mood 
effects. Mood effects as a function of regulatory fit have never been found (for a review see 
Avnet & Higgins, 2006). In the present study, again we did not find an influence of fit on mood. 
Moreover, if mood would mediate the relation between fit and value, a main effect of mood on 
value would be expected. However, our finding that value was influenced by fit, but not directly 
by our (successful) mood manipulation, further supports the idea that mood is not the mediator of 
value changes in fit-effects. 
Why does fit enhance value? 
Higgins and colleagues (2003) explained fit-effects in terms of a feeling of rightness with 
regard to the strategy employed. In case of fit, “ … [people] feel right about what they are doing 
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and this value experience transfers to the value experience involved in subsequent object 
evaluation” (Higgins et al., 2003; p. 1151; see also e.g., Avnet & Higgins, 2006). The question 
remains where this “feeling right” comes from and how exactly it transfers to the outcome. 
One possible mechanism, by which fitting decisions can result in a higher value of the 
chosen outcome than non-fitting decisions, is that they create a positive hedonic value, which 
decision-makers then misattribute to their decision-outcome. In case of fit, situational demands 
are in line with an individual’s current orientation. People can rely on their ongoing strategy, 
which feels natural and easy to them. They perceive their decision-process as fluent. The 
experience of fluency induces positive hedonic value, and this in turn results in more favourable 
evaluations (e.g., Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003).  
While such a fluency explanation of fit-effects can account for the current findings and 
many other findings, it cannot explain the result of a recent study which shows that initially 
negative stimuli are evaluated even more negatively when individuals experience fit (Idson, 
Liberman, & Higgins, 2004). These latter results suggest another explanation, namely that fit 
increases the level of confidence in reactions that decision-makers experience toward a decision-
outcome, regardless of whether those reactions happen to be positive or negative (e.g., Avnet & 
Higgins, 2006). In other words, people feel right about their reaction towards an object rather 
than about the object itself. The “feeling of rightness” might reflect a metacognition that a 
person’s current orientation matches the perceived requirements of the current concerns and 
situation (Schwarz, 2006). In other words, when situational demands to use a certain strategy, 
such as an instruction to decide deliberatively, match with people’s dispositional preferences or 
current orientations (e.g., mood states) people have the feeling that everything is going smoothly. 
This might result in more confidence in their decision, resulting in a more extreme subjective 
value of the chosen item (see also e.g., Avnet & Higgins, 2006).  
Finally, value-from-fit-effects have been exclusively studied by comparing fit with non-fit 
conditions. The absence of control conditions precludes any conclusion whether value-from-fit is 
due to (1) the positive effects of fit or (2) the negative effects of non-fit, or (3) both. Interestingly, 
in describing the effects most researchers seem to prefer the first option. However, we think it is 
worthwhile to consider the possible importance of non-fit. Non-fit can be framed as the conflict 
between ongoing information processing (e.g., either temporarily induced or dispositional) and 
situational demands (e.g., an instruction to use the opposite processing style). In literature on 
conflict monitoring it is argued that whenever two cognitive processes conflict, cognitive control 
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is recruited (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 
2004). The recruitment of control alters the ongoing cognitive processes and may decrease 
reliance on subsequent responses. As a consequence, in cases of conflict, people may attach 
lower value to chosen alternatives. Future studies, including control conditions may reveal 
whether the 'action' is indeed in non-fit. Another way to potentially reveal the mechanisms behind 
fit and non-fit would be to use social neuroscience paradigms. Interestingly, research on conflict 
monitoring has shown the critical importance of activation of the Anterior Cingulate Cortext 
(ACC), when people have to overcome their automatic responses, or natural tendencies (see 
Botvinick et al., 2004). Also, activation of the ACC has been linked with a drop in reward value 
(Bush et al., 2002). Therefore, it seems worthwhile to approach fit-effects in future studies from a 
conflict monitoring perspective. 
Fit and the quality and complexity of decisions 
Our results raise the question whether fitting decisions are better decisions than non-
fitting decisions. While we have shown that people may subjectively value their decision-
outcomes higher when they decide in a mood-compatible way, it is unclear whether and how fit 
could affect the objective quality of decision-outcomes. In future research, several hypotheses 
with regard to fit and objective quality could be studied. For example, when fit enhances reward 
value, people may become reluctant to change to other decision alternatives, even when these are 
objectively better. Moreover, it would be interesting to test the idea that fit would increase the 
objective quality of decision-outcomes because it increases the quality of information-processing. 
For example, happy mood individuals may outperform negative mood individuals when asked to 
base decisions on intuition, and negative mood individuals may perform better when asked to 
decide based on deliberation. The answer to the question whether fit also enhances the objective 
value of decision-outcomes seems to depend on whether the decision task requires a specific 
strategy.  
An issue that we believe is worth further exploration is the extent to which our finding 
would generalize to more complex or important decisions. Interestingly, complexity or 
importance might not necessarily mean that thoughtful deliberation is a better strategy than 
reliance on intuition (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004; Wilson, 2002). It is important to note that even 
with relatively simple decision-tasks, such as choosing which thermos to buy, what drink to order 
or what clothes to wear today, fit-effects between our mood states and the decision-strategies we 
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apply might have a considerable effect on our daily lives, simply because we make an enormous 
amount of such decisions every day. 
  
  
  
Chapter 5 
 
 
When You Are Happy, Prototypes Are Just Average 
EMG and Self-Report Evidence that Positive Mood Eliminates 
Preferences for Highly Familiar Prototypes 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on: 
De Vries, M., Holland, R. W., Chenier, T., Starr, M. J., & Winkielman, P. (2008). 
When you are happy, prototypes are just average: EMG and self-report evidence that positive 
mood eliminates preferences for highly familiar prototypes. 
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Abstract 
 
People tend to prefer prototypical stimuli over less prototypical ones – an effect presumably 
reflecting affective reactions to familiarity. The positivity of prototypes might depend on the 
extent to which individuals are tuned towards safety concerns. Tuning accounts of mood hold 
that mood serves as a conditioned signal for environmental safety and automatically tunes 
information processing and reactions to external objects so that they best serve the individual in 
the type of context it signals. As expected, we show that compared to a sad mood, a happy mood 
decreases the positive hedonic value of prototypes - as reflected in self-reported liking judgments 
as well as “smiling” activity measured with facial electromyography (EMG) - without decreasing 
the actual familiarity of prototypes. We conclude that mood changes the hedonic implications of 
the familiarity cue of prototypes. Only in a sad mood, people prefer prototypicality. In a happy 
mood prototypes are just average. 
 
Key words: Mood, Familiarity, Fluency, Facial EMG, Liking, Prototypes 
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Introduction 
 
Why do we like certain persons or objects in our environment and dislike others? One of the most 
robust and well-known determinants of preference is high prototypicality - a phenomenon 
referred to as the beauty-in-averages effect (for a review see e.g., Halberstadt & Rhodes, 2003). 
This effect occurs with a variety of stimuli, including faces, dogs, abstract patterns, watches and 
other everyday objects and with a variety of dependent measures, including preference 
judgments, liking ratings, and psychophysiological responses (e.g., Langlois & Roggman, 1990, 
Halberstadt & Rhodes, 2000; Winkielman, Halberstadt, Fazendeiro, & Catty, 2006). 
The beauty-in-averages effect is considered to reflect a more general tendency to prefer 
stimuli that are fluent (i.e., processed with relatively high speed and efficiency) and familiar (e.g., 
Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003). Fluency and familiarity can stem from being 
merely exposed to a stimulus, as demonstrated repeatedly in the research on the mere-exposure 
effect (Zajonc, 1968; Whittlesea & Price, 2001). However, prototypicality can be an even more 
powerful source of fluency and familiarity. This is because average stimuli (prototypes) resemble 
each individual exemplar we have seen before. For example, after you have met several of the 
“children,” their “parent” you have never met before can still appear highly familiar. This 
phenomenon was repeatedly demonstrated with a variety of stimuli ranging from random dots 
(Posner & Keele, 1968) to words (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). 
Prototypicality, positivity, fluency, and familiarity 
Despite the robustness of the effect, debate is still going on about its theoretical 
explanation. Several accounts see it as a reflection of low-level biological mechanisms. Some 
researchers propose that humans have a biological predisposition to interpret prototypicality as a 
cue to mate value (Symons, 1979). For example, facial, as well as bodily, prototypicality may be 
predictive of current or prior health, lending individuals with a prototypicality preference a 
reproductive advantage (Thornhill & Gangestad, 1993). Other researchers view this effect as 
deriving from inherent positivity of familiarity. One of the reasons for the hyper-familiarity of 
prototypicality is its fluency (Whittlesea, 2002). Consistent with this idea, Winkielman and 
colleagues (2006) have shown that prototypes were especially fluent, and especially liked, and 
that a significant proportion of liking for fluent prototypes was explained by their fluency. 
Further, not only did people rate prototypical stimuli as attractive, they also showed more 
positive genuinely affective reactions to prototypical stimuli, as was reflected in facial EMG 
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measurements (Winkielman et al., 2006). Zajonc (2001) argued that the mere exposure effect, 
presumably extensible to the prototypicality effect, can be considered as a form of conditioning in 
which the absence of negative consequences during previous exposure to a stimulus triggers 
positive affect which becomes linked to the stimulus.  
In contrast to the above accounts, which see the link between prototypicality and liking as 
relatively fixed, other accounts see this link as context dependent. Several authors have pointed 
out that familiarity is a cue to safety (e.g., Bornstein, 1989; see also Lee, 2001). Thus, as with any 
cue, its hedonic implications may change as a function of context. Similarly, the connection 
between fluency and positivity is presumably based on the heuristic value of the cue in a 
particular environment (Gigerenzer, 2008). We reasoned that the link between prototypicality and 
positive hedonic value might depend on the extent to which individuals are tuned towards safety 
concerns.  
Tuning models of mood hold that an individual’s mood state serves as a conditioned 
signal for environmental safety or danger and automatically tunes information processing and 
reactions to external objects so that they best serve the individual in the type of context it signals 
(Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994; Schwarz, 2002). According to these accounts, a sad mood 
state signals a problematic and potentially dangerous environment, tuning individuals towards 
safety concerns. Conversely, a happy mood signals benign environments, making safety concerns 
less central to happy individuals than to sad individuals.  
In the current research, we test whether mood changes the hedonic value of 
prototypicality. Most research on the preference for prototypes relies on self-reported liking or 
attractiveness ratings. The problem with such ratings is that it is unclear whether such ratings 
reflect genuine affective reactions to stimuli, or “cold” judgments of stimulus quality, which are 
driven by different processes. Genuine affective reactions occur early and are based on priming. 
In contrast, judgments occur later, they are more deliberative and reflect more strategic 
recollection (cf. e.g., Whittlesea, 2002). Therefore, it is important to rely on measurements that 
have the potential to capture the early, genuine affective reactions. Psychophysiological 
measurements, such as facial EMG, have this potential (e.g., Cacioppo, Petty, Losch, & Kim, 
1986; Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001).  
Positive affective reactions manifest themselves in greater activity in the cheek muscle for 
smiling, the zygomaticus major, whereas negative affective reactions manifest themselves in 
greater activity in the frowning muscle above the eyebrow, the corrugator supercilii. Corrugator 
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effects are more sensitive to the tonic (prolonged, resting) states, whereas zygomaticus effects 
reflect more phasic reactions (cf. e.g., Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001). Previous research (e.g., 
Harmon-Jones & Allen, 2001; Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001; Winkielman et al., 2006) 
demonstrated that facial EMG can successfully detect affective responses. These studies 
consistently showed increased EMG activity over the cheek, but not the brow region for merely 
exposed, fluently processed, and prototypical stimuli.  
We expected that mood would moderate the robust preference for prototypicality. We 
hypothesized that, compared to a sad mood, a happy mood would result in a decrease in the 
positive hedonic value of prototypes as reflected in self reported liking judgments as well as 
“smiling” activity (Study 5.1), without decreasing the actual familiarity of prototypes (Study 5.2). 
That is, we expected prototypes to be hyper-familiar (Whittlesea, 2002), with the hedonic 
implications of this familiarity cue changing as a function of mood.     
 
Study 5.1 
 
We aimed to test the expected differential impact of incidental happy versus sad mood states on 
affective reactions towards prototypes, in a paradigm recently used in a demonstration of genuine 
affective preference for prototypes (Winkielman et al., 2006, Study 3). After a mood 
manipulation, participants were exposed to mathematical distortions of random-dot-pattern 
prototypes (Posner & Keele, 1968). Usage of abstract stimuli (random dots) minimizes problems 
inherent to the usage of meaningful stimuli, such as symmetry or prior experience (Rhodes, 
Sumich, & Byatt, 1999).  
Specifically, participants were exposed to converging distortions (i.e. “seen distortions”) 
of a prototype. The fifteenth distortion (i.e., “unseen distortion”) and the prototype were never 
shown during the exposure phase. During the subsequent test phase, participants provided liking 
ratings for each of the following six test patterns: seen distortion, unseen distortion and prototype 
of the prepared category (during the exposure phase) and their controls from an unprepared (i.e. 
unexposed) category of dot patterns. Moreover, we used facial EMG to measure mood impacts 
on spontaneous affective reactions towards those stimuli. We predicted that individuals in a 
negative mood state would show a stronger preference in liking and spontaneous affective 
reactions for the prepared (compared to the unprepared) prototype than individuals in a positive 
mood state.  
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Moreover, the paradigm we used provided us with the opportunity to test the effect of 
single prior exposure of converging distortions of a prototype (i.e., “seen distortions”) on 
affective reactions and liking judgments to distortions. We only expected judgmental effects for 
distortions. Whereas exposure effects on genuine affective reactions usually require repeated 
exposure, judgments reflect more strategic processing (Harmon-Jones & Allen, 2001; Whittlesea, 
2002; Winkielman et al., 2006; Zajonc, 1968). 
Method 
We randomly assigned 16 students from the University of California, San Diego, who 
participated for course credits, to either a happy or a sad mood condition. Upon arrival, 
participants were fitted with EMG electrodes and resting EMG to determine participants’ pre-
experimental baseline was measured. Next, we manipulated participants’ mood state by 
instructing them to focus on and describe a happy versus sad autobiographical memory (e.g., 
Levine, Wyer, & Schwarz, 1994; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Then, we checked mood state with a 
7-pointscale question (“How do you feel right now?”), anchored with “very negative” and “very 
positive.” To maintain the induced mood state, participants subsequently started listening to 
music previously used to successfully induce either a happy or a sad mood state, including Eine 
Kleine Nacht Musik by Mozart and Adagietto by Mahler (Storbeck & Clore, 2005; Niedenthal & 
Setterlund, 1994). We also measured participants’ post-mood-manipulation EMG activity, which 
served as a physiological mood check.   
The successive dots task consisted of ten randomly ordered cycles of exposure 
(preparation) and testing (of prepared and control categories; counterbalanced between 
participants). During exposure, distortions were presented in the middle of the screen for 1000 ms 
with a 400 ms inter-stimulus interval. Participants were instructed to concentrate on each study 
pattern because they would later be asked to make various judgments about these patterns. 
During the test phase, dot patterns were presented in random order. Each trial was preceded by a 
blank screen (for 1000 ms), followed by a fixation point in the middle of the screen (for 1000 
ms). The test pattern was presented for 1500 ms, followed by a “*” (for EMG measurement 
purposes) in the middle of the screen (for 4000 ms). After this, participants were asked: “How 
much do you like this pattern?”, on a scale from 1 to 9 (self-paced).  
EMG Recording and Data Reduction. EMG recording and data-processing steps followed 
psychophysiological standards of Fridlund and Cacioppo (1986). Impedance was reduced to 
below 15 KΩ at those spots in the face (left cheek and eyebrow) where the 4 mm Ag/AgCl 
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surface electrodes would be placed. Smiling was assessed by the activity over the region of 
zygomaticus major (cheek) and frowning was assessed by the activity over the region of 
corrugator supercilii (eyebrow). Signals were acquired with BIOPAC MP150 equipment, 
sampled at 2000 Hz, with gain set to 2000, and filtered with a 5 kHz to 1 Hz band pass. 
Acquisition was controlled by BIOPAC’s AcqKnowledge software version 3.81, and further 
processing was performed with Mindware Corporation software. The signals were filtered from 
10 to 500 Hz, rectified, and integrated. The data were then standardized (converted to z-scores) 
within participants and muscles. Outliers were range corrected with values of +/- 3 SD. Finally, 
activity within 100 milliseconds intervals was calculated.  
Next, we calculated two measures of EMG activity. First, we calculated the measure of 
impact of the mood manipulation on participants’ background state. Specifically, we took the 
activity of facial muscles during 10 second of rest activity right after the mood induction. This 
activity was baseline-corrected by corresponding values in the 10-second rest period before the 
mood induction, and standardized (converted to z-scores) by participant and muscle. Second, we 
calculated the EMG activity in reaction to the presentation of different dot patterns (test – 
control). We calculated a baseline for each stimulus, defined as the activity during the last 900 ms 
in the pre-stimulus period. This period was selected because it was free of artefacts reflecting the 
orienting reaction to the onset of the new trial. Then, we calculated baseline-corrected activity to 
the presentation of test dot patterns in 1-second intervals. 
Results and Discussion 
Mood manipulation check. Participants indeed reported significantly more positive mood 
states in the happy (M = 5.50) than in the sad (M = 3.75) mood condition, t(14) = 2.82, p < .01, 
Cohen’s d = 1.51. Moreover, a mixed model ANOVA with Mood (happy vs. sad), Muscle 
(zygomaticus vs. corrugator), Time (10 seconds), and Gender (male vs. female) revealed a 3-way 
Muscle*Mood*Time interaction, F(9,108) = 2.29, p < .03, ηp² = .16. Mood effects were 
particularly pronounced in the later 5 seconds, especially for the sad mood. Specifically, in the 
sad mood, the corrugator activity was significantly greater than zygomaticus activity, t(7), = 3.63, 
p < .01, d = 1.36, whereas in the happy mood, there was no significant difference. In short, the 
mood manipulation was successful on both self-report and physiological measures, with tonic (as 
opposed to phasic) effects of sad mood especially notable on the corrugator. 
Main analyses. To assess the effects of prototype preparation on smiling we conducted a 3 
Stimulus Type (prototype vs. seen distortion vs. unseen distortion) x 5 Time (first trough fifth 
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second after stimulus onset) x 2 Mood (happy vs. sad) mixed model ANOVA revealed a 
significant 3-way Mood*Stimulus*Time interaction for cheek activity, F(8,112) = 2.10, p < .05, 
ηp² = .13. As illustrated in Figure 5.1, the difference in zygomaticus activity for the prepared 
versus the unprepared prototypes is significantly bigger for individuals in the sad versus happy 
mood condition as early as two second after stimulus onset, peaks at the fourth second and then 
disappears by second five. As expected, no prototypicality effects were obtained for frowning. 
 
Happy Mood
-0.05
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
1 2 3 4 5
Seconds
D
iff
er
en
ce
 in
 Z
-v
al
ue
s
prototype
seen
unseen
 
Sad Mood
-0.05
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
1 2 3 4 5
Seconds
D
iff
er
en
ce
 in
 Z
-v
al
ue
s
prototype
seen
unseen
 
Figure 5.1. Means and standard errors of EMG activity (zygomaticus major) as a function of stimulus type 
(prototype, seen distortion and unseen distortion) for a happy and sad mood state. 
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We also observed differences in liking judgments of old category versus new category 
stimuli as a function of mood. A 3 Stimulus Type (prototype vs. seen distortion vs. unseen 
distortion) x 2 Mood (happy vs. sad) mixed model ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of 
mood on liking differences, F(1,14) = 8.15, p < .02, ηp² = .37. As illustrated in Figure 5.2, the 
difference in liking for stimuli from the old versus new category of dot patterns was bigger in the 
sad than in the happy mood condition. Moreover, in the sad mood, but not in the happy mood 
condition (t < 1), people like the old prototype more than the new prototype, t(7) = 3.11, p < .02. 
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Figure 5.2. Means and standard errors of liking judgments as a function of stimulus type (prototype, seen distortion 
and unseen distortion) and of mood state (happy versus sad).  
 
In sum, the results form Study 5.1 showed that in a sad, but not in a happy mood, people 
prefer the prepared prototypes. These elicited more “smiling” and more favorable judgments than 
their controls, the unprepared prototypes. These results are in line with our hypothesis that the 
hedonic value of the familiarity cue of prototypicality only elicits genuine positive affective 
responses in a mood state tuned towards safety concerns (i.e., a sad mood state), but not in a 
mood state tuned towards exploration (i.e., a happy mood state).  
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Study 5.2 
 
Study 5.2 served two main objectives. First, we aimed to test our assumption that prototypical 
dot-patterns, prepared by exposure to converging distortions, were indeed familiar. That is, we 
expected to obtain a false memory effect (Roediger & McDermott, 1995; see Roediger, Watson, 
McDermott, & Gallo, 2001, for a review) for prepared but not previously shown prototypes. 
Second, if the decrease in preference for prototypicality in a happy mood state observed in Study 
5.1 is indeed due to mood changing the value of the familiarity cue of prototypes rather than 
familiarity itself, false memory for prototypes should be present in both the happy and the sad 
mood condition.  
Method 
Twenty students from the University of California, San Diego, participated for extra 
credit. They were randomly assigned to either a sad or a happy mood condition. First, we 
manipulated mood, using the same music as in Study 5.1, which also has previously been used to 
successfully induce either a happy or a sad mood state (e.g., Storbeck & Clore, 2005; Niedenthal 
& Setterlund, 1994). During the subsequent dots task, participants now gave memory ratings 
(confidence of recall on a 7-pointscale).  
Results and Discussion 
As expected, items from old, prepared categories of dot patterns were more familiar than 
items from new, unprepared categories. For each stimulus type (i.e., prototype, seen distortion, 
and unseen distortion) the difference in memory between prepared and unprepared items was 
greater than 0 and this held true for both moods (all one sample t-tests p < .01), see Figure 5.3. A 
3 Stimulus Type (prototype vs. seen distortion vs. unseen distortion) x 2 Mood (happy vs. sad) 
mixed model ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Stimulus Type on memory ratings, 
F(2,36) = 7.48, p < .01, ηp² = .29. Contrasts showed that seen distortions were more familiar than 
unseen distortions, F(1,18) = 20.79, p < .01, ηp² = .54, and crucially, the difference between the 
two unseen items, that is prototype and unseen distortion, was significant too, F(1,18) = 7.67, p < 
.02, ηp² = .30. Memory ratings for the “prepared” but unseen prototype did not differ from 
memory ratings for the seen distortion, F < 1, see Figure 5.3. So, we found a strong replication of 
the false memory effect for prototypes, using abstract stimuli (i.e., random dots; cf. e.g., Roediger 
& McDermott, 1995; for review see Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001).  
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Comparisons of confidence judgments to individual items in different mood states 
revealed that the difference between prototype and unseen distortion is significant in the positive 
mood condition, t(9) = 2.31, p <.05. However, in the negative mood condition, this difference 
was no longer significant (t < 1). That is, in a positive mood “false memory” for prototypes is 
greater than false memory for unseen items, but in a negative mood it is the same. Similarly, 
participants randomly assigned to the happy mood conditions differed more in their confidence 
ratings for recognition of the prototype of the old versus new category than participants randomly 
assigned to the sad mood condition, t(18) = 1.51, p < .08. So, prototypes were indeed familiar and 
this familiarity did not decrease in a happy mood state. If anything, a happy mood state increased 
the familiarity of unseen but prepared prototypes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Means and standard errors of memory judgments as a function of stimulus type (prototype, seen 
distortion and unseen distortion) and of mood state (happy versus sad).  
 
General Discussion 
 
In the current research, we aimed to test the impact of incidental mood states on the positivity of 
prototypicality. Our results provide evidence for the idea that this robust and presumed general 
tendency to prefer prototypical stimuli depends on mood. Only in a sad mood state, people prefer 
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prototypicality. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first study to show that the 
positivity of prototypicality measured as liking judgments changes as a function of mood. 
Moreover, convergent with the evidence on self-reported liking for prototypical stimuli, the 
current results show that mood impacts genuine positive affective reactions towards prototypical 
stimuli. We provide EMG evidence that only in a sad, but not in a happy mood state, prototypical 
stimuli increase activity in the “smiling” muscle. In other words, we have shown that prototypical 
stimuli can put a smile on a sad face. Importantly, prototypes appear at least as familiar in a 
happy as in a sad mood state, but in a happy mood, individuals just do not “care” about 
familiarity. 
The current findings appear to have important implications for the understanding of the 
positivity of prototypicality. The observed mood impact on hedonic reactions towards 
prototypicality suggests that the hedonic value of familiarity depends on the importance of its 
safety connotations for the individual in its current context. Mood states appear to tune affective 
responses towards prototypical stimuli. If an individual’s mood state signals a problematic 
environment, safety concerns become central to the individual, with spontaneous positive 
affective reactions towards familiar stimuli as a result. These results appear to corroborate the 
more general notion of the goal-dependency of spontaneous affective reactions towards objects in 
our environment (e.g., Ferguson & Bargh, 2004) and more specifically, the idea that the hedonic 
implications of heuristic cues are context-dependent (e.g., Gigerenzer, 2008). Consistent with this 
idea, another recent investigation provided evidence for enhanced liking of fluently processed 
stimuli in a prevention compared to a promotion focus (Freitas, Azizian, Travers, & Berry, 2005). 
However, those results did not clarify whether it was the hedonic implication of fluency, or 
fluency itself, which was context-dependent. We provide clear evidence for mood impact on the 
hedonic implications of familiarity. Moreover, without physiological measurement, it is unclear 
whether individuals merely give higher ratings to stimuli, or actually feel better.  
To conclude, our findings show the context-dependency of the hedonic value of 
familiarity of prototypicality and suggest that only in a sad mood state people are attracted to 
prototypicality and familiarity. In contrast, in a happy mood state, people do not put extra value 
on this.  
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When making a decision, we can rely on intuition as well as deliberation. In this dissertation, our 
primary goal has been to advance our understanding of the impact of mood states on intuitive 
versus deliberative judgment and decision making. Our proposal has been that the mood state of 
decision makers is an important influence on the reliance on affective reactions and logical 
analysis, or sense and sensibility. The preceding empirical chapters provided a detailed view of 
this issue. In this final chapter, I will adopt a broader view. I will consider the key empirical 
findings from the previous chapters and integrate these by providing an explanation of how they 
relate to the core questions of this dissertation. I will also discuss theoretical and practical 
implications of the empirical findings and suggest potential directions for future research. 
 
A review of the key findings 
 
This dissertation served two main objectives. The first aim was to test whether mood states 
influence the reliance on gut feelings versus analytical reasoning in judgment and decision 
making. The second aim was to gain more insight in the underlying mechanism by which mood 
impacts intuitive versus deliberative decision making. We suggested a tuning account and tested 
this with a focus on the fit between mood states and intuitive versus deliberative decision 
strategies and on the impact of mood on the human tendency to prefer prototypical stimuli.  
Mood and reliance on gut feelings and analytical logic 
First of all, we tested our expectation that mood affects the tendency to rely on gut 
feelings in decision making. In line with our expectation, our studies showed that compared to a 
sad mood state, a happy mood state appeared to result in stronger reliance on gut feelings. In 
Chapter 2, we used a task commonly used to test intuitive decision making in laboratory settings: 
the Iowa gambling task. We investigated the role of naturally occurring (Study 2.1) as well as 
experimentally induced (Studies 2.2 and 2.3) mood states in intuitive decision making. After we 
measured or manipulated their mood state, participants performed the Iowa gambling task. We 
indeed found that in the intuitive part of the Iowa gambling task, a happy mood was the winning 
mood.  
Our notion that a happy mood imposes an inclination on decision makers to rely on 
intuition was taken a step further in Chapter 4. Here, we reasoned that if a happy mood indeed 
imposes a tendency on decision makers to use intuition, then a match between a decision maker’s 
mood state and the applied decision strategy is likely to be beneficial, that is, to result in a fit 
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effect. Previous research showed that a fit between a decision strategy and the focus of an 
individual increases the subjective value of decision outcomes compared to a non-fit or mismatch 
(e.g., Higgins et al., 2003). In an experiment manipulating both mood states and decision 
strategies, we indeed found that decision makers in a happy mood valued their chosen outcomes 
more after making an intuitive than after making a deliberative decision, suggesting that a happy 
mood indeed imposes a tendency on decision makers to rely on intuition rather than deliberation.  
Second, we tested our expectation associated with the complementary part of our first 
main objective. That is, we investigated whether a sad mood state imposes a tendency on 
decision makers to rely on deliberation. We expected that sad decision makers would outperform 
happy decision makers in logical, rule-based decision making. This expectation was tested in 
Chapter 3. After a mood manipulation, participants made investment decisions (Study 3.1) or 
gambling decisions (Study 3.2) in tasks that require decision makers to follow a logical rule to 
maximize expected profit. The results of Chapter 3 support the idea that in a sad mood state, 
decision makers more strongly base their decisions on logical rules.  
Again, we found additional support for this complementary part of our idea that the mood 
state of decision makers impacts their tendency to rely on intuition versus deliberation in Chapter 
4. Analogously, we reasoned that if a sad mood indeed imposes a tendency on decision makers to 
use deliberation, then it is likely to fit with decision making based on a careful analysis of the 
pros and cons of various decision options rather than based on gut feeling. This is indeed what we 
found. Decision makers in a sad mood valued their chosen outcomes more after making a 
deliberative than after making an intuitive decision. This research also provides the first empirical 
evidence for a fit effect as a function of mood.  
In sum, in line with our expectations, happy decision makers indeed outperformed sad 
decision makers in intuitive decision tasks and sad decision makers outperformed happy decision 
makers in rule-based decision tasks. Together, these results indicate that happy versus sad mood 
states moderate reliance on affect versus logical reasoning in decision making. Moreover, we 
found that decision makers assigned a higher value to their decision outcome after making fitting 
(i.e., an intuitive decision in a happy mood or a deliberative decision in a sad mood) than after 
making non-fitting decisions. Previous research has so far neglected the potential influence of 
mood state on reliance on affective reactions versus logical analysis in judgment and decision 
making. This is surprising, given the prominent role of this distinction in the psychological 
literature. Whether individuals rely on intuition or on deliberation can have a significant impact 
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on their judgments and decision outcomes, with potentially far-reaching consequences for the 
well-being of affected persons. Taken together, the empirical findings discussed so far show that 
happy versus sad mood states appear to impose a tendency on decision makers to rely on 
deliberation or intuition. 
Moody tunes: Tuning in to deliberation and intuition 
Our second main objective was to further our understanding of the underlying mechanism 
by which mood impacts intuitive versus deliberative decision making. We suggested a tuning 
account for how mood states influence judgment and decision making. Specifically, based on the 
notion of situated cognition (e.g., Clore et al., 1994; Schwarz, 2002), we proposed that mood 
might function as a conditioned stimulus for the state of the situation individuals are in and might 
automatically tune cognition and emotion so that they best serve individuals in the type of 
context signaled by their mood states. We noted that the type of situation signaled by mood does 
not necessarily correspond to the actual state of the environment, since our mood states often spill 
over from one situation into another. In sum, according to our notion of the tuning function of 
mood, a state of happiness imposes a tendency on decision makers to rely on intuition whereas a 
state of somberness imposes a tendency on them to rely on deliberation. 
The empirical findings of this dissertation discussed so far are in line with the idea of a 
tuning function of mood in judgment and decision making. Nevertheless, alternative theoretical 
accounts are possible. The use of intuition rather than deliberation in a happy mood state might 
stem from deficits in processing capacity (e.g., Isen et al., 1982; 1987; Mackie & Worth, 1989; 
1991) or in motivation (e.g., Schwarz, 1990; Wegener & Petty, 1994). That is, in a happy mood 
state, decision makers might simply not have enough cognitive capacity available for careful 
deliberation, or they might lack the drive to engage in thorough deliberation before making a 
decision.  
However, in the empirical chapter on the fit between mood states and decision strategies 
(Chapter 4), we observed no difference in the time it took to make a deliberative decision for 
decision makers in either a happy or a sad mood state. This finding is contrary to capacity or 
motivation accounts of mood impacts. That is, if a happy mood would restrain processing 
capacity, one would expect that making a deliberative decision would take longer in a happy 
mood than in a sad mood state. And if a happy mood would reduce the motivation to engage in 
thorough deliberation, one would expect that decision makers in a happy mood state would 
devote less time to making a deliberative decision than decision makers in a sad mood state. This 
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does not rule out that a happy mood state might have decreased both processing capacity (which 
would increase decision time) and motivation (which would decrease decision time) to the same 
extent, with the opposite impacts on decision time cancelling each other out, but is does seem to 
render capacity and motivation accounts less likely.  
The results of mood impacts on the preference for prototypicality in the final empirical 
chapter provide even stronger support for a tuning explanation. In Chapter 5, we investigated the 
impact of mood on the general tendency for people to prefer prototypicality. Our expectation was 
that this preference would vary as a function of an individual’s mood state. The preference for 
prototypical over less prototypical stimuli, as measured by liking judgments as well as by 
spontaneous positive affective reactions, was indeed stronger in a sad than in a happy mood state. 
Only in a sad mood state people prefer prototypicality (Study 5.1). We showed that this mood 
effect on the preference for prototypicality is not due to an increase in familiarity of prototypes in 
a sad mood state (Study 5.2). If anything, prototypes become more familiar in a happy mood 
state, but in a happy mood, people just do not seem to care about familiarity. We conclude that 
mood appears to change the hedonic implications of the familiarity cue of prototypes. This 
research not only provides the first empirical evidence for the context-dependency of the 
positivity of prototypes, it also provides support for a tuning account of mood impacts on 
information processing.  
While capacity and motivation models of mood impacts on information processing do not 
provide a plausible account for these results, a tuning model does: The hedonic implications of 
the familiarity cue typical for prototypes differ as a function of mood because these implications 
depend on the extent to which individuals are tuned towards safety concerns. A sad mood state 
signals a problematic and potentially dangerous environment, and automatic tuning towards 
safety concerns is exactly what a sad mood does. In a happy mood, the familiarity of prototypes 
does not increase their hedonic value. In other words, a sad mood makes us prefer prototypicality, 
whereas in a happy mood, prototypes are just familiar. Taken together, the results of the current 
dissertation support the idea that happy versus sad mood states tune in to deliberation and 
intuition respectively in judgment and decision making.    
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Implications:  
Mood matters in judgment and decision making 
 
Based on the results presented in this dissertation, we conclude that mood matters in intuitive 
versus deliberative judgment and decision making. The effects we observed in our studies have 
some important implications. Firstly, the results presented here have theoretical implications for 
our understanding of the role of mood in intuitive and deliberative decision making. Secondly, 
they have practical implications for the decisions we all make in our daily lives. 
Tuning in: Imposing a tendency on decision makers 
An interesting question is whether people always use their affective reactions as a basis 
for judgment and decision making when they are in a happy mood and always base their 
judgments and decisions on a thorough, logical analysis of the relevant information when they 
are in a sad mood state. Our notion of the tuning function of mood is that mood states “prepare” 
decision makers to rely on intuition or deliberation. Tuning effects of mood can be overridden by 
other factors, such as an individual’s goal, or situational demands (e.g., Schwarz, 2002; see also 
e.g., Bless et al., 1996; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). This dissertation indeed shows that decision 
makers in a happy mood state appear to be able to deliberate and that decision makers in a sad 
mood state appear to be able to use intuition (Chapter 4). Previous research on mood impacts on 
affective priming showed that individuals in a sad mood appeared cautious to rely on their first 
affective responses. That is, they did respond in line with a primed affective reaction, but they 
were slower in responding than individuals in a happy mood state (Hermsen et al., 2008). 
Moreover, mood impacts on the use of intuition versus deliberation might depend on the 
availability of affective and analytical sources of information. If the only source of information 
that is available is a logical rule, individuals in a happy mood state might also use this logical rule 
as input for their judgments and decisions. And in a similar vein, if there is nothing else to rely 
on, even decision makers in a sad mood state might rely on their feelings. Individuals can 
probably overcome their mood-imposed tendency to rely on deliberation or intuition if analytical 
or affective sources (respectively) are unavailable. We are currently investigating these ideas and 
we found some preliminary supportive evidence (De Vries, Holland, & Witteman, 2008c). That 
is, after conditioning products with affect-laden pictures (positive, negative or neutral), choices as 
well as self-reported liking and wanting reflected the conditioned affective associations in a 
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happy as well as a sad mood condition. With only the affective source of information available, 
individuals in both happy and sad mood states used this as a basis for choices and judgments.  
Rules in decision making 
The current findings also seem to have important implications for our understanding of 
mood impacts on the extent to which individuals rely on rules in decision making. It is important 
to clarify mood impacts on rule-based decision making. There are two types of rules: rules of 
thumb, or heuristics, and logical rules. A happy mood state appears to increase the use of the 
former, a sad mood state of the latter. For example, previous research showed that in a happy 
mood, individuals more strongly rely on an activated stereotype (Bodenhausen et al., 1994) and 
on the ease of retrieval heuristic (Ruder & Bless, 2003). This dissertation has shown that a sad 
mood appears to increase the use of a simple logical rule. Reliance on heuristic “rules” is a form 
of simplified processing of information, based on associations and experiences, or System 1 
processing, typical for individuals in a happy mood state. In contrast, reliance on logical rules 
that stem from a careful analysis of the information which is relevant to a judgment or decision 
task is a form of System 2 processing, typical for individuals in a sad mood state. 
Real-life decision making 
This dissertation has provided empirical evidence for the role of mood in intuitive versus 
deliberative decision making. This evidence is based on experimental research in a controlled 
laboratory setting, which has the advantage that it allows for conclusions about the causal role of 
mood in intuitive and deliberative judgment and decision making. Mood matters. The kinds of 
decisions which we investigated include simple decisions with low-impact outcomes. In everyday 
life, we make many of such decisions. Even if we would only consider mood matters in the 
almost endless amount of relatively simple, mundane decisions, its impact in our daily lives 
would be significant. We also used a paradigm that models complex, real-life decision making in 
an uncertain environment (i.e., the Iowa Gambling task; Damasio, 1994). Therefore, we conclude 
that the tuning function of mood is likely to be a more general phenomenon, automatically 
imposing a tendency on decision makers to either rely on intuition or on deliberation, 
independent of the type of decision they are about to make. The mood impacts on judgment and 
decision making described in this dissertation appear to allow for the conclusion that mood also 
matters in real-life decision making.  
Whether mood state also affects the quality of our decisions in real-life is another 
question. If our affective reactions and logical analyses point in different directions, mood-
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induced intuitive or deliberative decision strategies can result in different decision outcomes. 
Which strategy is best seems to depend on many factors, such as the properties of the task (e.g., 
complexity), the criteria used to judge decision quality (e.g., ethical or economical criteria, and 
self-benefit or benefit for others), and domain-specific requirements (e.g., Hogarth, 2001; 2005; 
Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006; Plessner & Czenna, 2008; Tetlock, 2002; Wilson, 2002). As the 
observed fit effect in the current dissertation illustrates, it also seems important to take the 
subjective outcome quality into account. Finally, the extra time and effort we can invest in 
decision making processes in an attempt to maximize the objective outcome quality is not 
necessarily an investment worth making. Sometimes, maximizing decision outcomes simply does 
not offset the burdens of a lengthy decision making process. Decision makers need to balance 
effort and accuracy (e.g., Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993). It appears rational for decision 
makers in real-life, who only have a limited amount of time and energy available, to “satisfice” 
rather than maximize their decision outcomes, aiming for what is “good enough”, but not 
necessarily “the best” (e.g., Simon, 1955; 1957; 1983; see also Schwartz, 2004). A positive mood 
state seems helpful in this, due to the tendency it imposes on decision makers to rely on intuition.  
 
Directions for future research 
 
In this section, we would like to suggest some potential directions for future research to further 
our understanding of the role of mood, of intuition and deliberation, and of their interplay in 
judgment and decision making. Moreover, we would like to consider some related issues that 
might be worthwhile to investigate further. 
Fine tuning 
Future research could be aimed at further elucidating the tuning mechanism by which 
mood appears to influence intuitive or deliberative decision making. An intriguing question is 
whether mood states impact the use of gut feelings, the occurrence of gut feelings (i.e., their onset 
and strength), or both. It is unclear whether the observed mood impact on intuitive decision 
making is due to people having stronger gut feelings in a positive mood state than in a negative 
mood state, or to a stronger reliance on these affective reactions in a happy than in a sombre 
mood state. While we interpret the impact of mood on intuitive decision making as mood 
influencing the tendency of decision makers to rely on affective reactions, the observed effect of 
mood on affective reactions towards prototypical stimuli in Chapter 5 raises the question whether 
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mood might also have impacted affective reactions towards choice options (i.e., somatic markers) 
in Chapter 2.  
With the use of psychophysiological measurements, such as skin conductance responses 
(cf. Bechara et al., 1997) or EMG, future research could aim to find an answer to the empirical 
question whether somatic markers are stronger in a happy mood (e.g., due to individuals in a 
happy mood being able to integrate large amounts of information better than individuals in a sad 
mood, cf. Bless et al., 1996; Bruner, 1957; Isen, 1987), in a sad mood (e.g., due to mood impacts 
on the hedonic implications of riskiness, cf. Chapter 5), or equally strong in both mood 
conditions. Intriguingly, affective reactions might have been stronger in a sad mood, but still 
more influential in a happy mood, because of the reluctance to rely on affective cues in a sad 
compared to a happy mood state (cf. Hermsen et al., 2008). A related question is whether 
individuals are more able to perform logical analyses when they are sad than when they are 
cheerful. Our results (Chapter 3) showed no difference in understanding of a logical rule between 
mood conditions. Rather, in a sad mood individuals appeared to stick to it longer than in a happy 
mood. 
Probably, it is not only mood that matters when it comes to intuitive versus deliberative 
judgment and decision making. It seems worthwhile to examine other potential factors that might 
impact the use of intuition versus deliberation. These factors include environmental cues for the 
safety or danger of a situation (e.g., Schwarz, 2002) and domain-specific requirements, as well as 
personality factors, such as the abilities, confidence and experience of decision makers, and 
dispositional preferences for intuitive versus deliberative decision-making (e.g., Epstein et al., 
1996; cf. Betsch & Kunz, 2008; De Vries et al., 2008b). Other factors that have been linked to 
mood states might also impose a tendency on individuals to use intuition or deliberation. These 
include approach versus avoidance orientations (e.g., Friedman & Förster, 2001), global versus 
local focus (e.g., Gasper & Clore, 2002), and left versus right hemispheric activation (e.g., 
Davidson, 1992; Koch, Holland, & Van Knippenberg, in press; Rotenberg, 2004; Satpute & 
Lieberman, 2006). Finally, it would be interesting to investigate the effects of other affective 
states than happiness and sadness, such as anger, on the use of intuition versus deliberation in 
judgment and decision making (cf. e.g., Lerner & Tiedens, 2006; Harmon-Jones, 2004). 
Zooming out 
Taking a broader perspective, perhaps the most pressing direction for future research is to 
address the diverse challenges that arise when decisions truly matter because of their impact on 
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our well-being or on the well-being of others. Challenges may be particularly high in case of for 
instance medical decisions, which can be irreversible and often have significant implications for 
patients’ well-being. We know from previous research that affect plays an important role in 
health communications and in the construction of health preferences (e.g., Peters et al., 2006). In 
a new line of research, we are currently beginning to explore mood impacts on the effectiveness 
of decision aids for the construction of health preferences (see also Kerstholt, Van der Zwaard, 
Bart, & Cremers, 2008). Future research also seems essential in domains where affective and 
intuitive versus deliberative processes seem to be of particular importance, such as in moral, 
ethical and social judgment and decision making and in other areas where people try to influence 
or help others in the choices and decisions they make, for example in careers counseling, 
advertisement, and promotional campaigns by governments or non-profit organizations.  
In an endeavour to improve decision quality and contentment, an important question for 
future research is when intuition beats deliberation, and vice versa. Several attempts have been 
made to answer this question (e.g., Hogarth, 2001; 2005; Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006; 
Dijksterhuis et al., 2006; Plessner & Czenna, 2008; Wilson, 2002; Wilson & Schooler, 1991). 
These attempts highlight a number of aspects which appear to be of importance, including 
characteristics of the environment (e.g., the presence and nature of feedback), of the decision task 
(i.e., complexity in terms of amount of information involved), of the decision maker (e.g., quality 
of implicit and explicit knowledge), and interactions between those factors. For instance, some 
recent studies suggest that intuitions stemming from unconscious thought might be especially 
important in complex decision tasks, when our deliberative, cognitive resources are not always 
sufficient (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006; see also Nørretranders, 1998; 
Wilson, 2002). It seems important to take this a step further and to investigate whether happy 
versus sad mood states might help to improve decision quality when either intuition or 
deliberation appears to be the best decision strategy.  
We recently started to investigate the potential role of mood in unconscious thought. 
Mood might impact judgments and decisions based on unconscious thought in several ways. 
First, mood might impact the process of unconscious thought. We know from previous research 
that compared to a negative mood, a positive mood enhances associative processing and 
creativity (e.g., Bolte et al., 2003; Hänze & Hesse, 1993; Isen, 1987; Isen et al., 1987), which are 
characteristic of unconscious information processing (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2007; Dijksterhuis & 
Nordgren, 2006; Sadler-Smith, 2008; Wilson, 2002). Therefore, elucidating the impact of mood 
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on the process of unconscious thought appears to be a fruitful direction for future research. 
Second, mood might impact the use of the products, or intuitions, that stem from unconscious 
thought. The exact nature of these intuitions is as yet unclear. For example, it is unknown to what 
extent these “summary judgments the unconscious provides when it is ready to decide” 
(Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006, p. 106) are affective in nature. Therefore, whether the mood 
state of individuals also impacts the tendency to rely on intuitions stemming from unconscious 
thought is an interesting question that remains to be tested. 
Finally, individuals might often profit from the use of intuition as well as deliberation, 
rather than using either intuition or deliberation in judgment and decision making. In fact, in our 
daily lives we often use a bit of both intuition and deliberation. Future research might be aimed at 
understanding how intuition and deliberation might interact and complement each other. For 
example, affect might help to prioritize information we need to analyze more carefully (e.g., 
Damasio, 1994; Peters, 2006). An interesting assumption is that wise decision makers blend 
affect and reason, intuition and deliberation.  
 
Closing remarks 
 
In the investigations presented in this dissertation, we have shown the impact of a ubiquitous 
factor in human decision making: a decision maker’s mood state. We investigated the impact of 
mood states on a fundamental distinction in judgment and decision making, that is, the use of 
intuition versus deliberation. Our findings demonstrate that mood matters. A happy mood state 
appears to tune in to reliance on gut feelings and a sad mood state to analytical reasoning. 
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Mood Matters in Judgment and Decision Making 
Tuning in to Deliberation and Intuition  
 
 
Mood states influence the reliance on gut feelings (intuition) versus analytical reasoning 
(deliberation) in judgment and decision making. 
• Compared to a sad mood state, a happy mood state causes a stronger inclination in 
decision makers to rely on intuition (Chapters 2 and 4). 
• Compared to a happy mood state, a sad mood state causes a stronger inclination in 
decision makers to rely on deliberation (Chapters 3 and 4). 
 
Fitting decisions enhance the subjective value of a decision-outcome. 
• Individuals in a happy mood state value a decision-outcome more after making an 
intuitive decision and individuals in a sad mood state value a decision-outcome more after 
making a deliberative decision (Chapter 4). 
• Individuals with a dispositional preference for intuitive decision making value a decision-
outcome more after making an affect-based decision and individuals with a dispositional 
preference for deliberative decision making value a decision-outcome more after making 
a decision based on a careful analysis of the pros and cons (Chapter 4).  
 
Mood changes the hedonic implications of the familiarity cue of prototypes. 
• Compared to a sad mood state, a happy mood state decreases the positive hedonic value 
(self-reported and measured by EMG) of prototypes (Chapter 5). 
• Compared to a sad mood state, a happy mood state does not decrease the familiarity of 
prototypes (Chapter 5). 
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Oordelen en Beslissen met Gevoel 
Afstemmen op Deliberatie en Intuïtie 
 
Het maken van keuzes is een belangrijk onderdeel van ons leven. Dag in dag uit vormen we 
oordelen en nemen we beslissingen. Zo besluiten we bijvoorbeeld om psychologie te gaan 
studeren, een huis in Nijmegen te kopen of om op vakantie te gaan in Spanje. Ook nemen we 
voortdurend meer alledaagse beslissingen. We beslissen welke producten we kopen in de 
supermarkt, nemen een abonnement op onze favoriete ochtendkrant en bestellen ons 
lievelingsdrankje op het terras als de zon schijnt. Velen van ons nemen ook beroepsmatig 
belangrijke beslissingen. Rechters beslissen bijvoorbeeld over de toekomst van een verdachte, 
hulpverleners stellen diagnoses en investeerders nemen belangrijke financiële beslissingen. 
Oordelen en beslissen doen we op verschillende manieren. We kunnen diep nadenken ofwel 
delibereren voordat we beslissen, maar we kunnen ook ons gevoel volgen, intuïtief beslissen. Dit 
proefschrift gaat over de invloed van stemming op ons vertrouwen in intuïtie en deliberatie bij 
oordelen en beslissen. 
 In eerder onderzoek naar de rol van stemming bij oordelen en beslissen is vrijwel geen 
aandacht geschonken aan de invloed van stemming op het afgaan op gevoelens en overwegingen, 
ofwel intuïtie en deliberatie, bij het nemen van beslissingen. Of we afgaan op ons gevoel of op 
ons verstand, kan echter van grote invloed zijn op onze oordelen en beslissingen. Onze gevoelens 
en overwegingen wijzen immers niet altijd in dezelfde richting. Wanneer ik bijvoorbeeld trek heb 
in een tussendoortje, kan mijn gevoel me verleiden tot het eten van een chocoladereep, maar op 
basis van mijn verstand zou ik eerder kiezen voor een appel. Het doel van dit proefschrift is meer 
inzicht te krijgen in het effect van stemming op het gebruik van intuïtie en deliberatie bij 
oordelen en beslissen. Hierbij staan de volgende twee vragen centraal: Wat is het effect van een 
vrolijke versus een verdrietige stemming op het afgaan op intuïtie versus deliberatie en hoe werkt 
dit? 
 In hoofdstuk 1 van dit proefschrift geef ik een overzicht van relevante theorieën en 
empirische studies over de rol van stemming bij intuïtief en doordacht oordelen en beslissen. Ik 
maak in de eerste plaats onderscheid tussen verschillende vormen van affect: affectieve 
toestanden ofwel stemming aan de ene kant en affectieve reacties zoals intuïties aan de andere 
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kant. In overeenstemming met gangbare definities binnen de psychologie vatten wij stemming op 
als diffuse affectieve toestanden ofwel achtergrondgevoelens die relatief lang aanhouden. Je bent 
in een vrolijke of verdrietige stemming, gedurende enkele minuten of zelfs uren. Affectieve 
reacties echter, zijn gevoelens die we hebben als reactie op een object, persoon, situatie of 
keuzemogelijkheid. Deze vorm van affect omvat intuïties ten aanzien van keuzemogelijkheden en 
is gewoonlijk intenser en van kortere duur dan stemming. De bovengenoemde vormen van affect 
kunnen op verschillende manieren onze oordelen en beslissingen beïnvloeden. Dit proefschrift 
beschrijft de eerste empirische studies naar de invloed van vrolijke en verdrietige affectieve 
toestanden op het afgaan op affectieve reacties versus analytisch redeneren bij oordelen en 
beslissen. In welke stemming zijn mensen meer geneigd om op hun gevoelens af te gaan, in een 
vrolijke of in een verdrietige stemming? In welke stemming zijn mensen juist meer geneigd om 
doordachte beslissingen te nemen? 
 In hoofdstuk 1 bespreek ik ook het prominente onderscheid binnen de besliskunde tussen 
intuïtie en deliberatie. Daarnaast geef ik een overzicht van de verschillende manieren waarop 
affect een rol kan spelen bij oordelen en beslissingen. Hierbij contrasteer ik moderne opvattingen 
over de rol van affect en intuïtie bij oordelen en beslissen met klassieke, normatieve modellen 
binnen de besliskunde. Binnen deze klassieke modellen was de gangbare opvatting dat het 
vormen van oordelen en het nemen van beslissingen puur rationele en doordachte 
aangelegenheden zijn. Tegenwoordig hebben veel onderzoekers aandacht voor het mogelijke 
belang van affect en intuïtie bij oordelen en beslissen.  
Hierna ga ik in op de door ons veronderstelde afstemming op intuïtie en deliberatie door 
de opgewekte of sombere affectieve toestand, ofwel stemming, van beslissers. Ons idee is dat 
stemming mensen voorbereidt om intuïtief dan wel doordacht te oordelen en beslissen. Hieraan 
ligt de meer algemene veronderstelling ten grondslag dat we ons denken, voelen en handelen 
automatisch afstemmen op de aard van de omgeving waarin we onze doelen proberen te bereiken. 
Verschillende factoren, onder andere onze stemming, dienen mogelijk als een signaal voor de 
aard van onze omgeving. In een goedaardige omgeving, waar alles op rolletjes loopt, is het 
gewoonlijk niet nodig om alles voorzichtig en grondig te overdenken. Individuen kunnen dan op 
hun eerste ingevingen, op hun intuïtie, vertrouwen. Als er echter potentieel gevaar dreigt of de 
omgeving problematisch lijkt, maar de precieze aard van de problemen onduidelijk is, is het 
belangrijk om voorzichtiger te zijn en alle potentieel relevante aspecten van de omgeving goed te 
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analyseren. Volgens het afstemmingsmodel werkt stemming als een geconditioneerd signaal voor 
de goedaardige of problematische aard van onze omgeving. 
We hebben de rol van stemming bij oordelen en beslissen in vier empirische 
hoofdstukken beschreven (hoofdstukken 2, 3, 4 en 5). Onze verwachting was dat een vrolijke, 
opgewekte stemming zou leiden tot de neiging om intuïtief te beslissen en dat een verdrietige, 
sombere stemming zou leiden tot de neiging om doordacht en analytisch beslissingen te nemen. 
De studies die we in deze hoofdstukken beschreven hebben, volgden een algemeen stramien: Het 
eerste gedeelte van iedere studie bestond uit een manipulatie (de meeste studies) of een meting 
van stemming. We maakten gebruik van verschillende stemmingsmanipulaties, waaronder het 
vertonen van een vrolijk of verdrietig filmfragment. Het tweede gedeelte van onze studies 
omvatte vervolgens een meting van oordelen en beslissingen gemaakt door deelnemers in een 
vrolijke of verdrietige stemming. Hierbij maakten we gebruik van zowel bestaande als nieuw 
ontworpen paradigma’s.  
In hoofdstuk 2 hebben we in drie studies de rol van stemming bij het afgaan op affectieve 
signalen bij het nemen van beslissingen onderzocht. Hiervoor speelden deelnemers na een 
stemmingsmeting of stemmingsmanipulatie de Iowa goktaak, een veel gebruikte taak voor het 
meten van intuïtieve beslissingen in een laboratorium. In deze goktaak leren deelnemers al 
doende bij welke van vier stapels kaarten ze gemiddeld geld winnen en bij welke ze gemiddeld 
geld verliezen. Belangrijk is dat hierbij verschillende fasen zijn te onderscheiden, waaronder een 
intuïtieve fase, waarin deelnemers wel het gevoel hebben dat sommige stapels beter zijn dan 
andere, maar nog niet precies kunnen uitleggen waar dit gevoel vandaan komt. Volgens 
verwachting vonden we in alle drie de studies dat deelnemers in een opgewekte stemming betere 
keuzes maakten in deze intuïtieve fase van de Iowa goktaak dan deelnemers in een bedroefde 
stemming. Deze bevindingen bieden empirische ondersteuning voor het idee dat een vrolijke 
stemming leidt tot een sterkere neiging om beslissingen te baseren op affectieve reacties dan een 
verdrietige stemming. 
Het complement van onze verwachting over de rol van stemming bij intuïtief en 
deliberatief beslissen hebben we in hoofdstuk 3 beschreven. We hebben hier in twee studies het 
effect van een vrolijke of verdrietige stemming op deliberatief beslissen onderzocht. Wederom 
speelden deelnemers een gokspel nadat we hun stemming gemanipuleerd hadden. Ditmaal 
onderzochten we de mate waarin deelnemers in een vrolijke of verdrietige stemming vasthielden 
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aan een logische regel bij het nemen van beslissingen. We maakten hierbij onder andere gebruik 
van de door ons ontworpen Radboud University Logic versus Experience (RULE) taak. Opnieuw 
waren de resultaten in overeenstemming met onze verwachting: Deelnemers in een sombere 
stemming hielden meer vast aan een logische regel dan deelnemers in een vrolijke stemming. 
Deze bevindingen vormen empirische ondersteuning voor het idee dat een sombere stemming 
leidt tot een sterkere neiging om deliberatief te beslissen dan een opgewekte stemming. 
In hoofdstuk 4 bouwden we vervolgens voort op en vonden we aanvullend bewijs voor 
ons idee dat een vrolijke stemming leidt tot de neiging om op intuïtie af te gaan en dat een 
verdrietige stemming leidt tot de neiging om op analytische redeneringen af te gaan. We 
onderzochten het mogelijke effect van het al dan niet bij elkaar passen van een vrolijke of 
verdrietige stemming aan de ene kant en een intuïtieve of deliberatieve beslisstrategie aan de 
andere kant op de mate waarin beslissers de uitkomst van hun beslissing positief waarderen. 
Zoals verwacht was bij een goede klik tussen stemming en beslisstrategie (vrolijk en intuïtief; 
verdrietig en doordacht) de subjectieve waarde van een beslisuitkomst hoger dan wanneer 
stemming en beslisstrategie niet goed bij elkaar pasten. We vonden een vergelijkbaar effect voor 
de klik tussen persoonlijke voorkeuren voor intuïtief en deliberatief beslissen en de gebruikte 
beslisstrategie. Het gevonden effect van de klik tussen stemming en intuïtief of doordacht 
beslissen biedt ook ondersteuning voor het door ons veronderstelde afstemmingsmodel.  
Het veronderstelde afstemmingsmodel hebben we in hoofdstuk 5 verder onderzocht door 
te kijken naar de invloed van affectieve toestanden op de neiging om een voorkeur te hebben 
voor gemiddelde, prototypische stimuli. Prototypische stimuli vertonen de meeste 
overeenkomsten met ieder individueel exemplaar uit een categorie en komen mensen daarom 
over het algemeen vertrouwd en bekend voor. Nadat je als het ware enkele “kinderen” gezien 
hebt, komt de “ouder” die je nooit eerder gezien hebt je toch erg bekend voor. Redenerend vanuit 
het afstemmingsmodel hangt de mate waarin mensen deze vertrouwdheid als positief ervaren 
mogelijk af van hun stemming. Een verdrietige stemming signaleert volgens dit model een 
problematische en mogelijk gevaarlijke omgeving. Hierdoor was onze verwachting dat 
prototypische stimuli aantrekkelijker zouden zijn voor mensen in een verdrietige stemming dan 
voor mensen in een vrolijke stemming. Dit bleek inderdaad zo te zijn. Bovendien bleek de mate 
waarin deze stimuli bekend voorkomen niet minder te zijn in een vrolijke dan in een verdrietige 
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stemming. Affectieve toestanden lijken dus, zoals verwacht, reacties af te stemmen op de aard 
van de omgeving die ze signaleren. 
Tot slot bestaat hoofdstuk 6 uit een samenvattend overzicht van de belangrijkste 
bevindingen van dit proefschrift, gevolgd door een bespreking van de theoretische en praktische 
implicaties van deze empirische bevindingen en suggesties voor vervolgonderzoek. Zo wijzen de 
bevindingen uit dit proefschrift op het belang van het onderscheid in tenminste twee typen regels: 
vuistregels ofwel heuristieken aan de ene kant en logische regels aan de andere kant. In een 
vrolijke stemming gaan we meer af op vuistregels en in een verdrietige stemming gaan we juist 
meer af op logische regels. Verder zou een opgewekte stemming ons in het dagelijks leven 
kunnen helpen bij het maken van de overweldigende hoeveelheid keuzes. Het lijkt rationeel om 
met de beperkte tijd en energie die we hebben, te kiezen voor opties die “goed genoeg”, maar niet 
noodzakelijk “de beste” zijn. Een vrolijke affectieve toestand helpt ons hier mogelijk bij door af 
te stemmen op intuïtie.  
 Kortom, de in dit proefschrift beschreven studies tonen de invloed van een 
alomtegenwoordige factor bij oordelen en beslissen: de stemming van de beslisser. Onze studies 
bieden bewijs voor het idee dat mensen in een vrolijke stemming geneigd zijn om intuïtief te 
beslissen en dat mensen in een verdrietige stemming geneigd zijn om deliberatief te beslissen. De 
vrolijke of verdrietige affectieve toestand waarin iemand verkeert, lijkt af te stemmen op het 
gebruik van gevoelens tegenover analytische overwegingen.  
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Verschillende mensen zijn de afgelopen jaren betrokken geweest bij voor mij belangrijke 
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onderzoek. Bedankt dat je me ook na het afronden van mijn proefschrift de mogelijkheid bood 
om bij jou verder te gaan in het onderzoek. Ik zie uit naar nog vele inspirerende besprekingen en 
mooie nieuwe studies met jou de komende tijd!  
Mijn collega’s van de afdeling Medische Besliskunde in Leiden dank ik voor hun besluit 
om mij als nieuwe collega aan te nemen en voor de hartelijke ontvangst op de afdeling! Ik vind 
het erg leuk om met jullie samen te gaan werken. Jan, Rinie en Jochem, dank voor de heerlijke 
slaapplek in de duinen toen ik aan mijn nieuwe baan in Leiden begon. Anne, Cees, Lotte en 
Nienke, bedankt dat ik vervolgens de zomer door mocht brengen in jullie huis in Oegstgeest, 
samen met Bram de kat. Eva, bedankt voor je hulp in Leiden en wat fijn dat we elkaar nu gewoon 
even op de fiets kunnen opzoeken! Graag wil ik hier ook de mensen bedanken die de afgelopen 
tijd met mij mee hebben gedacht over mijn toekomst, in het bijzonder: Cees en Eva Midden, 
Jacob, José, Nicole, Rob en Thea.  
Mijn dank ook aan mijn Nijmeegse collega’s van met name de afdelingen Gezin en 
Gedrag, Klinische Psychologie en Sociale en Cultuur Psychologie, voor overleg, samenwerking 
en gezelligheid. Monique Zegers, met wie ik niet alleen een kamer, maar ook verjaardagsdatum 
bleek te delen en Mieke, bedankt voor de fijne tijd, jullie waren geweldige kamergenotes! 
Monique van de Ven, dank voor al je proefschrift- en promotietips. Graag wil ik ook mensen 
bedanken die mij op allerlei manieren hebben geholpen met mijn onderzoek. Hedwig, Katja, 
Lanneke, Marijke en Thea, heel hartelijk bedankt voor alle ondersteuning! Veel van mijn 
scriptiestudenten hielpen mee met lopend onderzoek voor mijn proefschrift. Ook anderen hielpen 
bij de opzet, afname en dataverwerking van verschillende studies, waaronder Hilde, Ron, Stijn, 
Eva, Maarten, Pam, Ronny, Bjorn, André, Harrie, Jos, Gerard en natuurlijk alle studenten die 
deelnamen aan de in dit proefschrift beschreven studies. Bedankt allemaal! 
Dankwoord (Acknowledgements)   
 138
Collega’s van de diagnostische besluitvormingsgroep, dank voor het uitwisselen van 
ideeën tijdens de besprekingen. Daarnaast speciale dank aan John, voor de fantastische data-
analytische hulp, aan José voor de inspirerende gesprekken en samenwerking en aan Leontien 
voor extra meelezen en voor het zijn van een fijne medepromovenda in de groep al die jaren. 
Collega’s van de afdeling Sociale en Cultuur Psychologie, bedankt dat ik altijd mocht 
aanschuiven voor inspirerende besprekingen en praatjes en bedankt ook voor de vele gezellige 
sociale gelegenheden. Madelijn, bedankt voor onze memorabele trips door de USA, door 
California en door de Deep South, als vertegenwoordigers van het Blues Science Institute (BSI)! 
Ischa, ik vond het heel bijzonder om samen met jou de laatste fase van het schrijven van een 
proefschrift door te gaan. Bedankt voor de fijne en productieve schrijfdagen en voor de lekkere 
meergranen croissantjes van de bakker! Ischa en Severine, geweldig dat jullie mijn paranimfen 
wilden zijn! Dank voor al het meedenken en voor al jullie hulp de afgelopen tijd. Het voelt goed 
om jullie aan mijn zijde te hebben. Verder mijn dank aan collega’s uit de rest van het land voor 
de goede samenwerking en leuke contacten. 
I would also like to thank my colleagues and friends from abroad. Piotr, thank you for 
giving me the opportunity to visit you at the University of San Diego in California. It is great to 
work with you! Moreover, thank you for all the interesting and fun activities and experiences, 
such as your excellent sightseeing tour of Warsaw, having authentic Mexican fish tacos, lots of 
spicy Thai food, sushi and even raw, and surprisingly delicious, food in Hillcrest. Thomas, thanks 
for all your hospitality! Piotr, Troy, Mark, Thomas, Sabine, Minna, Kate, Claire, Hilda, Dave, 
Don, Andy, Stuart and others from the Psychology Department at UCSD, thanks to all of you for 
the wonderful time in San Diego! I would also like to thank Olivier for the great collaboration 
and Sascha for great email discussions on mood and affect. 
Graag wil ik ook mijn vrienden en vriendinnen bedanken. Als dit boekje uitkomt, ken ik 
veel van mijn Nijmeegse vrienden precies tien jaar. Nienke, Wiede, Stijn en Eva, bedankt voor 
jullie vriendschap al die jaren! Jeanine, Richard, Theo, Ine, Dorine, Vincent, Joost, Martin, 
Martin, Tineke, Anke, Wout en anderen met wie ik jarenlang beneden aan de Berg en Dalseweg 
woonde, bedankt voor de mooie tijden en vriendschappen, ook na de Gildehuistijd! Ook andere 
vrienden en vriendinnen wil ik hier graag bedanken, in het bijzonder Eva, Marjolein, Annemarie 
en de Indiagangers Michiel, Sofie, Jasper, Anouk, Frans, Bert en Mieke. Mieke, ik vind het echt 
geweldig dat je dit boekje zo mooi wilde illustreren! Dank ook voor je verdere ondersteuning in 
de voorbereidingen van mijn promotie.  
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Mijn ouders, Marilène en Jos, dank jullie wel voor alle interesse, steun, liefde en 
vertrouwen die jullie mij de afgelopen jaren en daarvoor altijd hebben gegeven. Bedankt voor de 
stevige basis én de vrijheid om te doen wat ik wilde, ik heb altijd op jullie kunnen bouwen en 
vertrouwen! Wieteke, mijn lieve zusje, en Roel, jullie ook heel erg bedankt voor alle interesse en 
steun. Dank ook aan de rest van mijn familie, in het bijzonder aan oma en tante Grada. Jacques en 
Francien, Andrea, Guus en Luuk, Bram, Emmy en Anna, jullie wil ik ook heel erg bedanken voor 
de steun die jullie me altijd gegeven hebben en de belangstelling die jullie altijd getoond hebben. 
Jacques en Francien, jullie zijn fantastische schoonouders. We kunnen alles samen delen en dat 
voelt heel bijzonder. Andrea, Guus en Luuk, bedankt ook voor al jullie gastvrijheid op de 
boerderij. 
Tot slot, de voor mij meest dierbare beslissing vindt zijn oorsprong in Varanasi, India. 
Wat een ontmoeting, tijdens de millenniumwisseling, daar aan de oevers van de Ganges! We 
besloten elkaar nog eens te ontmoeten, in Bombay, in Bangkok, op Schiphol, in Middenmeer, 
Nuenen en Nijmegen. Jij kwam naar Arnhem, later kozen we samen voor een fantastisch huisje 
bij het bos aan de Berg en Dalseweg in Nijmegen. We kozen ook samen voor Ecuador, Frankrijk 
en Spanje. Voor India en Indonesië. Voor Jordanië, Tanzania en Ierland. Voor Salsa en San 
Diego. Voor Bryce, Zion en de Grand Canyon. Voor elkaar, vooral voor elkaar. Jacob, mijn 
meest intense en gelukkigste gevoel betreft jou. Dank voor al je steun, vertrouwen en liefde. Ik 
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